



THE FALSE HOPE OF UNION DEMOCRACY 
 




Over the course of the twentieth century, labor unions emerged 
across the globe in reaction to the widespread growth of industrial 
wage labor.  The relative strength of unions saw a secular decline in 
the late twentieth century that has only continued in the early 
twenty-first century.  Debates among sympathetic activists and 
scholars over the sources of this decline and how to reverse it have 
intensified alongside resurgent contemporary concern with eco-
nomic inequality.  This article argues that the recurrent focus of 
American labor scholars and activists within these debates on in-
creasing internal union democracy as a means of revitalizing unions 
is fundamentally misguided.  The promotion of liberal procedural 
rights, including broader and more direct elections, as a mechanism 
of accountability and source of renewed institutional dynamism will 
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only further hasten the demise of labor unions in the United States 
and elsewhere.  
By contrast, labor unions were historically founded in explicitly 
corporatist, group-based notions of democratic process.  Following 
corporatist theories of politics which allow the state to legally iden-
tify and regulate collective bargaining agents, unions operate to cen-
tralize and aggregate labor interests to facilitate their core functions 
of wage-bargaining and the acquisition of political capital.  Thus, 
unions’ potential for achieving social influence and economic justice 
for their members is predicated on accumulating power through col-
lective action. Collective action whose potency correlates with the 
effective strength of unions’ powers of internal discipline in and out-
side the workplace – powers directly undermined by solely liberal 
conceptions of the union/worker relationship and are unavoidably 
sourced in performative loyalty rather than electoral accountability. 
Following this corporatist logic, over the long-run, efforts to pro-
mote greater internal union democracy have failed to improve the 
performance of unions as wage-bargainers or as political agents.  
Unions have been key to movements for political democratization, 
but this effect has been achieved by channeling and disciplining 
class politics rather than serving as the foundation for the bottom-
up creation of social movement capital.  Following a misconception 
of the individual workplace as a source of class solidarity, proce-
dural localism focuses labor conflict where workers are most vul-
nerable to retaliation and least likely to induce broad based solidar-
ity, a mistake only worsened by contemporary workplace 
authoritarianism. As a result, internal union democracy campaigns 
over the long run have ultimately resulted in weakened unions later 
returning to corporatist strategies.  Moreover, the emphasis on in-
ternal union democracy has left unions susceptible to judicial and 
political assaults across the globe which exemplify the limits of neg-
ative liberal rights to address social power asymmetries, especially 
in common law countries.  This mistaken focus on union democracy 
is redoubled when the international influence of U.S. labor scholar-
ship inspires calls for union democratization as a salutatory reform 
elsewhere. 
To substantiate these claims, this article uses a trilateral compar-
ison between the development of collective bargaining in the United 
States, Brazil, and China to demonstrate the inevitable pull of unions 
towards corporatist bargaining, even among nations with quite dif-
ferent regulatory regimes—but all where calls for greater union 
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democracy have at points been made.  The article reinterprets the 
history of the decentralized U.S. labor union model, formally in-
fused with liberal procedural norms, as one where the success of 
U.S. unions followed their ability to replicate corporatist behaviors 
through union mergers, pattern bargaining, sympathy strikes and 
other collective tactics, described as “aspirational corporatism.”  By 
contrast, the relative success of the now-threatened Brazilian union 
model has been predicated on the elision of liberal norms, described 
as “hyper-corporatism,” even though calls for union democracy 
were a rallying cry during Brazil’s political democratization.  These 
two examples are then contrasted with the Chinese Communist 
Party’s experiments with workplace proceduralism within its state 
labor union as a tactic to weaken the horizontal bonds of the ever-
growing Chinese labor movement, while also seeking to designate 
collective bargaining units to ease labor unrest—described here as 
“simulated corporatism.” 
This comparative and historical analysis is not meant to critique 
the role of unions as instruments for economic fairness, but it is 
meant to help guide efforts to best realize their capabilities.  The cor-
poratist function of unions naturally moves them away from more 
radical reforms to transform the modern workplace which would 
alienate other established economic and political actors. In this re-
gard, no structural configuration of internal union procedure can 
substitute for the presence of a broader labor politics or specific la-
bor party. Thus, efforts to create or foster workplace relations gov-
erned by deeper norms of participatory economic democracy should 
be directed elsewhere. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Early in 2015, the Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU) cel-
ebrated one in a series of hard-won victories in its struggle within 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), in this case pre-
serving the right for IBT members to directly elect their national rep-
resentatives.1  As the largest union in the United States, the TDU’s 
struggles have often served to symbolize the U.S. labor movement’s 
long-standing preoccupation with the ideal of union democracy.  
Union democracy herein is generally conceptualized as how inter-
nal union structures replicate the participatory and liberal proce-
dural norms, and most are often focused on elections as a form of 
institutional accountability.  This American preoccupation with un-
ion democracy is not sourced solely in its parallels to political ac-
countability but also the participatory spillover effects its propo-
nents imagine for larger issues of economic and political equality.  
The replication of electoral dynamics within the union is argued to 
serve as a supportive microcosm of political democracy where citi-
zens can develop democratic expectations and experience, all of 
which contribute to the groundwork for social movements promot-
ing more radical workplace reforms in the future.   
Arguments about the social utility of union democracy thus en-
gage with broader ideals concerning the nature and sources of eco-
nomic democracy, understood to mean either, in the general sense, 
the state of economic fairness in a society or, in the specific sense, 
the participation of workers in workplace decision-making.  In par-
allel to concerns regarding the health of political democracy more 
generally,2 growing economic inequality has been seen as an indica-
tion of the decline of economic democracy in the general sense and 
the advancement of technocratic conceptions of managerial exper-
tise and authority in the workplace as tied to the decline of economic 
democracy in the specific sense.  While the modern citizen is often 
assumed in her role as a consumer to effectively filter and process 
complex data in a world of growing financialization, in her role as a 
producer she is assumed to have little capacity to contribute 
                                               
1 Alexandra Bradbury, Teamsters Secure Their Right to Vote, In Time for 2016 
Election, LABOR NOTES (Jan. 28, 2015), http://labornotes.org/2015/01/teamsters-se-
cure-their-right-vote-time-2016-election [https://perma.cc/CZP7-D4AW]. 
2 Compare ANTHONY DOWN, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957), with 
BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER (2007). 
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meaningfully to workplace decision-making and to have been re-
warded with increasingly smaller shares of total economic produc-
tion. 
Current debates about inequality now occur as the global state 
of labor unions has been one of an almost universal secular decline 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.  Growing frus-
tration has been expressed by labor scholars and activists that the 
decline of unions is a root cause of economic inequality and labor’s 
political relevance.  The extensiveness of this trend has induced 
what Guy Mundlak recently diagnosed as a deep anomie among la-
bor scholars.3  Beyond growing inequality, this anomie also reflects 
the continued rebuffing of hopes that the twentieth century rise of 
collective bargaining, alongside the growth of welfare state arrange-
ments, would progressively assuage the dislocations of labor com-
modification that Karl Polanyi identified at the heart of industrial 
capitalism.4  
In the context of this growing concern with economic inequality, 
it is not surprising then that in American debates over how to com-
bat inequality union democracy is cited as a critical means to revi-
talize American unions and recapture the link between meaningful 
work and citizenship.  Notably, intra-corporate forms of worker or-
ganization are illegal in the United States, even though workplace 
governance is also precluded as a topic of collective bargaining.  
Nonetheless, a tight association is believed to exist between union 
democracy and general economic democracy, or at least the expec-
tation of a future inter-relationship, and as an asserted form of par-
ticipatory specific economic democracy.  In turn, the international 
influence of American labor scholarship has both directly suggested 
and indirectly inspired calls for union democracy abroad. 
Yet, in many ways the American preoccupation with union de-
mocracy is an exceptional one.  Labor unions first emerged in early 
ninetieth century Europe and then spread worldwide, not as liberal 
democratic institutions but as corporatist institutions.  In its broad-
est terms, corporatism refers to a general theory of politics holding 
that group-based bargaining and negotiation over economic and so-
cial differences were the fulcrum of general economic democracy, 
often called social democracy.  Many early forms of corporatism 
                                               
3 Guy Mundlak, Workplace—Democracy: Reclaiming the Effort to Foster Public and 
Private Isomorphism, 15 THEOR. INQ. LAW 160 (2014). 
4  KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). 
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were wholly illiberal in conception, most notably Italian fascism, but 
still made claim to democratic legitimacy by virtue of representing 
social interests through corporatist groups, including those predi-
cated on economic, religious or other significant social cleavages.  In 
most corporatist regimes the state took an active role in designating 
corporatist actors and regulating the structure of their bargaining.  
In the context of wage labor, labor unions were designated to repre-
sent the interests of workers in negotiations with employer groups.  
The very success of these corporatist regimes was then dependent 
on both channeling and disciplining workers collectively in order to 
strengthen unions’ broader social bargaining power. This discipline 
was needed to make unions’ bargaining credible, and centrally in-
cluded the ability to induce strikes, but also included other forms of 
political discipline, such as voting, economic discipline, such as con-
sumer boycotts, but also workplace discipline, in order compete 
with managerial discipline over issues of performance. As such, un-
ions’ relationships with workers constituted intertwined channel of 
obligations and loyalty. 
As a result of the European influence of corporatist theories, the 
place of individual procedural rights associated with American un-
ion democracy as a one-sided restraint of individual workers over 
unions is still largely absent from the majority of national labor un-
ion traditions.  Pathways for workplace participation exist in these 
traditions, including work councils and forms of co-determination, 
but even here these institutions are distinct from labor unions and 
their internal procedures deviate significantly from norms of liberal 
representation.  Moreover, the wage bargaining and political aggre-
gation functions of corporatist unions are predicated on at least par-
tial insulation from individual legal claims against their decisions 
and actions, and unions are thus often granted some combinations 
of the disciplinary powers cited above.  In such context, a general 
distinction is easy to draw between union democracy and work-
place democracy. 
The corporatist roots of unions also reflect a presumption that 
unions would have an integral relationship with larger national la-
bor movements and specific labor parties.  Throughout the course of 
the twentieth century, corporatist unions played key roles as socie-
ties transitioned from feudalism or colonialism to political democ-
racies.  In the vast majority of these national histories, unions’ power 
was directly tied to their ability to nurture political solidarity among 
diverse workers.  However, even the crucial grassroots actions of 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
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unions during times of democratic transitions were not organized at 
the level of individual workplaces.  The effectiveness of unions as 
bargainers for their constituents was never uncontroversial, but 
mechanisms of accountability were presumed to exist not through 
elections or the litigation of other procedural legal rights but rather 
through external state regulation of labor union institutional design 
and the loyalty that unions inspired from their performance as col-
lective bargainers. Moreover, the larger responsibility of actually en-
gaging in social democratic political action was the purview of labor 
movements and parties which, no matter how strong the overlap, 
were distinct from unions themselves. 
In contrast to the presumptions of American proponents of un-
ion democracy, for corporatist unions the introduction of procedural 
liberalism thus not only undermines union discipline but leaves 
them vulnerable to opportunistic judicial assault.  Whenever unions 
are expected to reconcile their collective action on equal footing with 
negative individual rights, the consequence is deconstruction—al-
ready near completion in the United Kingdom and well in progress 
in the United States.  Not surprisingly, this deconstruction has in 
recent decades been paired with the increasing insulation of unions’ 
historical twin, the corporation, from these same claims of demo-
cratic proceduralism. 
Even more acutely, the expectation that union democracy will 
fuel the systemic revitalization of unions fundamentally misconcep-
tualizes how the social power of unions is generated.  To link union 
democracy to collective action requires viewing the individual 
workplace as the motor force of labor activism.  Yet, the generally 
transitory effects of union revitalization efforts in the United States 
and elsewhere reveal that such efforts are illusory and heavily de-
pendent on the external infusion of social capital into unions from 
labor movements rather than the reverse.  While unions were key to 
channeling worker interests into the social movements necessary to 
provoke political democratization, this success was rarely, if ever, 
dependent on intensifying intra-union participatory decision-mak-
ing.  And, in turn, most post-democratization unions either turned 
to embrace corporatism or faded from social influence. 
Moreover, however one may imagine earlier industrial work-
places, the general social atomization of modern work, and the 
growth of managerial authority therein, has rendered individual 
workplaces even more unreliable as long-term generators of social 
capital for unions.  The ideal of the workplace as a bottom-up 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/2
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foundation for social democratic vitality is, unfortunately, funda-
mentally at odds with the logics of capital formation that now disci-
pline the modern workplace. Further, any structural focus on the in-
dividual workplace aims at both where workers are most vulnerable 
to retaliation and least likely to inspire recognition of their larger 
social context and interests. 
Following the global proliferation of what David Harvey has 
called flexible accumulation5—ever accelerated by the denationali-
zation of financial capital—no human process of localized social 
capital formation can match the current logistical speed and scope 
of capital mobility.6  In specific contexts over limited time hori-
zons—most often involving intense general political mobilization or 
small homogenous nations—episodic union democracy campaigns 
can appear to transcend this mismatch.  Yet, without a larger labor 
politics to sustain them these apparent successes are ground away 
by the steady-state operation of the mobility mismatch between hu-
man and financial capital.  As a result, efforts at promoting union 
revitalization through the promotion of union democracy ultimately 
leave weakened unions and labor movements returning to corporat-
ist patterns of formal and informal centralization.  And such recur-
rence is especially prominent in spatially large and demographically 
diverse nations. 
It is thus not surprising that the American norm of union democ-
racy traditionally found little sustained purchase outside its national 
border.  Regardless of variations in their specific institutional struc-
ture and legal regulation, the success of most every union tradition 
has been grounded in corporatism, identified over a century ago by 
Robert Michels as an example of his iron law of oligarchy.7  While 
American labor union activists often decry these trends, the compar-
ative and historical scholarship on labor unions reveals that collec-
tive bargaining systems that have been best able to serve the collec-
tive interests of their workers are those of corporatist variety.  This 
is not a claim that labor unions, as part of their political and eco-
nomic bargaining, do not, or should not, directly engage with work-
ers, but that their need to operate collectively requires them to do so 
largely outside the bounds of the liberal proceduralism epitomized 
by elections and individual rights-claims.  Corporatist unions are 
                                               
5 DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1989). 
6 Sanford Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democ-
racy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 17 (2008). 
7 ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1911). 
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susceptible to bureaucratic inertia, especially after eras of relative 
success, and many regimes may falter in their direct engagement 
and collective mobilization of workers.  However, a strategic preoc-
cupation with electoralism as a form of accountability often saps and 
localizes the very energy that sustains large forms of collective mo-
bilization, a reality that the enemies of labor organization have 
learned well in the United States and elsewhere.  
It is this corporatist reality of labor union organization and ac-
tion that gives lie to the false hope of union democracy.  To exem-
plify such, this article will explore the early twentieth to early 
twenty-first century trajectories of three labor traditions with very 
different modern institutional and legal arrangements, namely, 
those of the United States, Brazil and China.  These comparative ex-
amples represent quite divergent economic and political contexts, 
but they represent not only large swaths of the workers globally, but 
each has also taken turns as promoted models of economic develop-
ment.  In addition, for all three countries a historical relationship ex-
ists between labor unions and movements towards or away from 
political democratization.8  Of further concern, labor discourse in 
Brazil and China have shown signs of the influence of American la-
bor scholarship’s focus on union democracy, where its asserted 
promises are held out to energize the performance and social rele-
vance of unions. 
The ultimate aim of this comparative analysis is not to critique 
labor unions as instruments for great social equality or general eco-
nomic democracy.  Quite to the contrary, this article unabashedly 
does not attempt to persuade those currently unconvinced of the 
value of labor unions, but to reshape the orientation of those who 
do.  Nor does it advance holistic indicia to comparatively evaluate 
union performance.9  What is does seek, especially in the American 
context, is to properly orientate reforms that will improve labor un-
ion performance through recognition of their function as corporatist 
institutions.  Furthermore, this corporatist nature does argue against 
expectations that labor unions themselves will act as the vanguard 
of more transformative economic reforms, especially those that 
                                               
8 Jedidiah Kroncke, Property Rights, Labor Rights and Democratization: Lessons 
from China and Experimental Authoritarians, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2013). 
9 One pitfall of competing agendas for labor reform is the different metrics of 
evaluation employed by researchers.  Claudia Senik, Income Distribution and Subjec-
tive Happiness: A Survey (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Pa-
pers, Working Paper No. 96, 2009) (providing a subjective discussion on the issues 
of income inequality and income comparisons). 
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would promote genuine workplace democracy.  Labor unions are, 
rather, at their best as creatures of social democracy.  The need of 
unions to bargain with other social interests militates against such 
radicalism, as it would alienate its bargaining partners. While it is 
understandable that some may want to breath more radical dreams 
into unions, such often only speaks to the weakness in larger labor 
politics or the absence of a genuine labor party. But, again, this 
dream is ultimately self-defeating. 
Refocusing on a larger labor politics in the context of Mundlak’s 
global labor anomie eschews the defensive posture encouraged by 
the enervating trends of global labor politics.  This article sees a lucid 
understanding of corporatism as itself part of a more aggressive or 
aspirational re-envisioning, and shows how at this point in history 
such attempts must be informed by comparative analysis.  While 
comparative analysis is traditionally fraught with methodological 
challenges,10 the empirical richness and general interconnection of 
the global economy militate against arguments asserting cultural ex-
ceptionalism.11  Moreover, domestic labor politics invariably invoke 
the experience of foreign nations, and without active comparative 
analysis these invocations tend towards idealization and mutual 
misrepresentation.12  Similarly, comparative historical work can 
draw out general dynamics from the long wave of twentieth century 
union development and activities.  This long wave perspective helps 
to deconstruct domestic mythologies and to displace arguments that 
extrapolate from more transitory developments, of which union de-
mocracy is the most evident American example.13 
                                               
10 See, e.g., Guy Mundlak & Matthew W. Finkin, Introduction to the Comparative 
Labor Law Handbook, in COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW 1 (Matthew W. Finkin & Guy 
Mundlak eds., 2015) (indicating the inherently comparative nature of the law and 
specifically, labor law). 
11 See Anita Chan, The Fallacy of Chinese Exceptionalism, in CHINESE WORKERS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (Anita Chan ed., 2015) (arguing that the concept of 
exceptionalism diverts researchers’ attention away from similarities between na-
tional systems). 
12 Harry Arthurs, Cross-National Legal Learning: The Uses of Comparative Labor 
Knowledge, Law, and Policy, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE 
STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 357 (Katherine Stone & Harry Arthurs eds., 
2013); Katherine Stone, Green Shoots in the Labor Market: A Cornucopia of Social Exper-
iments, 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 293 (2015). 
13 Compare Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Un-
ion Revitalization in the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. SOC. 303, 304 (2000) (ex-
amining union revitalization through the use of disruptive tactics), with Kate Bron-
fenbrenner, The American Labour Movement and the Resurgence in Union Organizing, 
in TRADE UNIONS IN RENEWAL 32 (Peter Fairbrother & Charlotte A. B. Yates eds., 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
626 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3] 
To develop this general argument, this article progresses in four 
parts.  Section 1 will provide background on theories of corporatism 
and the historical roots of labor unions’ development as a central 
instantiation of corporatist politics.  Section 2 will present a revision-
ist interpretation of the rise and fall of the U.S. labor union model, 
exemplar of the decentralized and privately-ordered variety, that 
has been undermined by the Sisyphean and ultimately counterpro-
ductive effort to prioritize liberal proceduralism.  To wit, the one-
time success of the U.S. labor movement was heavily dependent on 
creating informal corporatist dynamics through union mergers, pat-
tern bargaining, sympathy strikes and other tactics to scale-up bar-
gaining with employers, herein described as “aspirational corporat-
ism.”  Section 3 discusses the modern Brazilian experience, perhaps 
the most successful contemporary large-scale labor movement.  A 
central actor in the country’s 1988 transition to political democracy, 
in Brazil unions had long promised greater union democracy in their 
rise to political relevance, but immediately turned to entrench a 
strong corporatist labor regime post-democratization with near zero 
internal democratic norms, described herein as “hyper-corporat-
ism.”  Brazil now has a labor regime whose corporatist elements 
have been specifically targeted to undermine unions’ political 
power.  Section 4 engages the contentious role of the state labor un-
ion in contemporary China, where the communist presumption of 
perfect alignment between Party and worker interests left the state 
union scrambling for relevance after 1978.  Local union elections 
have emerged in recent years as a permitted site of experimentation 
within the state union as a preemptive strike against broader labor 
mobilization that could fuel political democratization.  Simultane-
ously, the central government has also allowed experimentation 
with large scale collective bargaining as a solution to growing labor 
unrest—described herein as “simulated corporatism.”  Section 5 
concludes by arguing that these examples all demonstrate, in differ-
ent ways, why labor union reform should always emphasize 
strengthening corporatism, and that union democracy is often a 
practical and rhetorical liability in contemporary labor politics.  This 
is a pressing issue for clarity in the U.S. and elsewhere as the health 
                                               
2006) (discussing signs of resurgence in the American labor movement through 
grassroots education).  The view of Michels’ law as something ideologically dis-
tasteful often motivates focusing on short-term surveys and analysis within nations 
to find counterexamples.  The latter is illustrative as it took the brief uptick in late 
1990s’ American union membership to extrapolate optimistic trends into the future. 
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of general economic democracy is at risk worldwide.  To the extent 
that we may hope of a world where both general and specific eco-
nomic democracy suffuses our economies, these hopes should look 
beyond unions to other alternatives and in a way that does not ulti-
mately undermine labor unions’ current, and pressing, utility in the 
present. 
 
2.  THE INEVITABILITY OF LABOR UNIONS AS CORPORATIST 
BARGAINERS 
 
2.1.  The Gravitational Pull of Union Corporatism 
 
There exists a wide range of arguments traditionally advanced 
for why labor’s empowerment in the workplace is a desirable social 
goal, ranging from the moral to the purely utilitarian.14  In recent 
decades, labor politics has had to respond to the failure of com-
munist regimes that presumed that ideological adherence to worker 
welfare in command and control economies was sufficient to 
achieve worker empowerment.15  Within capitalist nations, most of 
these arguments are tied to variants of economic democracy, em-
phasizing either the fairness of income/wealth distribution or the 
empowerment of works in social politics.16  Proponents of economic 
democracy take a wide range of positions on the welfare state, which 
provides direct subsidies to insulate workers from the vagaries of 
labor market turnover.17  And there is an equally wide range of ob-
jections to arguments regarding such protections, including the ne-
oclassical argument that such efforts are ultimately 
                                               
14 See, e.g., Guy Mundlak, Workplace – Democracy: Reclaiming the Effort to Foster 
Public and Private Isomorphism, 15 THEOR. INQ. L. 159 (2014).  Note that this article 
will not provide an independent defense of labor unions, as its audience is primar-
ily labor scholars and activists who almost exclusively share a normative commit-
ment to labor politics. 
15 Monty L. Lynn, Matjas Mulej & Karin Jurse, Democracy without Empower-
ment: The Grant Vision and Demise of Yugoslav Self-Management, 40 MGMT. DECISION 
797 (2002). 
16 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1956).  
17 James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001). 
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counterproductive for both social and individual welfare.18  Such 
disagreements stem from quite fundamental disjunctions as to the 
goals of economic development, from maximizing measurable indi-
ces of leisure or income19 to more aesthetic considerations of per-
sonal development or virtue.20  And underlying these variations are 
often opposed visions of the very nature of social life itself.21  Disen-
tangling the relationship between economic freedom and liberty is 
as challenging as articulating the gaps between formal legal freedom 
and political liberty.22  The recent revival of interest in theories of 
economic republicanism, which refute the private/public liberty 
distinction, reflects the ongoing turmoil to reconcile economic capi-
talism with political democracy.23 
However, if we return to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, we can see an even more diverse and contested range of 
possibilities than exist today about what regulation of the workplace 
should look like and what role the state should play therein.  The 
historical emergence of labor unions was not based on any single 
vision of political economy.  Fascism and communism were origi-
nally cast as “democratic” systems in a political vernacular very far 
from the presumptions of modern liberal democratic norms.24 
Unregulated, privately organized labor movements were active 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in most every 
                                               
18 See John Pencavel, The Legal Framework for Collective Bargaining in Developing 
Economies, in LABOR MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 27, 45 (Sebastian Edwards & Nora 
Claudia Lustig eds., 1999) (arguing that labor unions harm economic growth). 
19 Take, for example, the anthropological critique of Keynes’ optimistic view 
of industrial progress as yielding high levels of modern leisure in MARSHALL 
SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (1972). 
20 A popular meta-theory today is Amartya Sen’s concept of human capabili-
ties. See Kevin Kolben, Labour Regulation, Human Capacities and Industrial Citizenship, 
in LABOUR REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES  60 (Shelley 
Marsh & Colin Fenwick ed., 2016). 
21 Perhaps no greater disjuncture exists between proponents and critics of la-
bor unions than regarding the nature of social coercion.  More libertarian concep-
tions see labor markets as places of natural freedom, where others see the need to 
participate in labor markets as itself the coercive effect of biology and industrial 
economics.  The background presumption of this article falls toward the latter, see-
ing a lack of state intervention in creating or regulating labor markets as leading to 
private feudalism.  See, e.g., MARK S. WEINER, THE RULE OF THE CLAN (2013). 
22 Compare the discussion of economic liberty versus economic freedom in Pe-
ter Levine, The Libertarian Critique of Labor Unions, 21 PHIL. & PUBLIC POL’Y Q. 17 
(2001), with RAYMOND HOGLER, THE END OF AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS (2015). 
23 ROBIN HAHNEL, ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY: FROM COMPETITION TO 
COOPERATION (2005). 
24 Michael J. Hogan, Corporatism, 77 J. AMER. HIST. 153, 153-54 (1990). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/2
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industrializing nation, naturally incident to large scale transitions to 
wage labor.  Such labor movements often advanced aggressive vi-
sions of economic democracy from those grounded in communism 
to those grounded in republicanism.  Yet, as the contest between 
these new political visions played out in industrializing nations, the 
specific way in which the questions of how collective labor organi-
zations were to be institutionalized in non-communist regimes took 
on a distinctly corporatist character. 
In contrast to democratic theories that rest upon individual con-
ceptions of rights and participation, corporatist theories of social or-
ganization were originally predicated on facilitating the bargaining 
of particular group interests.25  Thus, in contrast to pluralist versions 
of democratic participation,26 corporatist theories asserted that so-
cial harmony was best achieved through state designation of collec-
tive intermediaries to both formulate and express the interests of 
particular social forces.27  The role of individual rights, both vis-à-
vis the state and these groups, was peripheral at best in corporatist 
politics.  In fact, the ability of corporatist agents—whether repre-
senting class, religious, ethnic, or other broad social interests—to 
bargain effectively with other designated groups was predicated on 
their ability to discipline their constituents in order to make good on 
the social pacts they achieved, as well as to effectively mobilize col-
lective action in support of these bargaining processes in and out-
side of the workplace. 
Following this logic, Robert Michels classically articulated his in-
fluential theory of social politics in what he called the iron rule of 
oligarchy.28  Michels argued that the demands of centralization were 
inescapable in any new social movement as it moved into the realm 
of regular politics.  Corporatist arrangements were the natural out-
growth of this tendency, and attempts to infuse these groups with 
liberal notions of democratic participation were doomed given the 
inevitable bureaucratization of any hierarchical organization and 
                                               
25 Larry G. Gerber, Corporatism and State Theory: A Review Essay for Historians, 
19 SOC. SCI. HIST. 313 (1995). 
26 Francesca Bignami, Civil Society and International Organizations: A Liberal 
Framework for Global Governance, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 14 (2009). 
27 John Goldthorpe, The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist Tendencies 
in Modern Western Societies, in NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC LIFE 124 (Bryan Rob-
erts et al. eds., 1985). 
28 ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE 
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden & Cedar Paul trans., Do-
ver Publications) (1962). 
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would undermine their functioning in the regular politics after rev-
olutionary moments.29 While beyond the scope of this analysis, the 
resistance of corporations to liberal norms tells a parallel story as the 
historical corporatist twin of unions.  
With these broad strokes in common, where most corporatist 
theories of politics diverged, especially in their normative frames, 
was in their view of the role of state.  Philippe Schmitter, pioneering 
modern scholar of corporatism, argued that traditionally state-dom-
inated forms of corporatism would give way to what he identified 
as societal corporatism.  Schmitter’s key distinction was that under 
state corporatism, the state legally designates and licenses the 
groups eligible to participate in political and economic bargaining.  
In contrast, under societal corporatism, such groups arise spontane-
ously from civil society.30  The analytic frame of “neo-corporatism” 
emerged in the 1980s as scholars tried to divine the increasingly 
murky dynamics of formal and informal bargaining that character-
ized the relationship of the state to particular economic and social 
interests,31 a term redeployed to help describe the persistence of bu-
reaucratic authoritarianism32 and financial corporatism in otherwise 
neoliberal economies.33 
Yet, while most European nations eventually came to embrace 
liberal theories of political democracy to varying extents as they 
built up their post-World War II welfare states, the most lasting im-
pact of corporatist theories in modern life was in the institutionali-
zation of labor unions.34  Labor corporatism was attractive to a 
                                               
29 A dreary diagnosis from a more participatory democratic frame, and it is 
not surprising that Michels himself grew disenchanted with German social democ-
racy and later became an apologist for Italian fascism.  The coherence and general 
validity of Michels’s work, in contrast to his common citation, is critiqued in Ewan 
McGaughey, Democracy or Oligarchy? Models of Union Governance in the UK, Germany 
and US (King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 35, 2017). 
30 Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. OF POL. 85 
(1974). 
31 Klaus Von Beyme, Neo-Corporatism: A New Nut in an Old Shell?, 4 INT’L POL. 
SCI. REV. 173 (1983). 
32 See GUILLERMO A. O’DONNELL, MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTHORITARIANISM 51–53 (1973) (charting the degree of modernization in connec-
tion to the level of democracy in the political system in South American countries). 
33 Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1 (1987); Mark Blyth, The Ghosts of Corporatism’s Past and Past Corporat-
isms: Commentary on Three Articles, 5 CAPITALISM & SOC’Y Art. 4 (2010). 
34 HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOUR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF 
WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974); Ruth Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employ-
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variety of political regimes, especially those concerned with subvert-
ing more radical labor movements.  Fascist and authoritarian re-
gimes, even those that came into power with the support of labor 
movements, routinely acted to purge labor leaders and re-organize 
private labor unions under a single state-controlled union.35  For lib-
eral democratic regimes, creating systems of labor corporatism still 
served to quell and channel labor unrest while appealing to notions 
of social democracy.36 
Today, ongoing state certification of labor unions continues to 
be popular, and reflects the general presumption that collective bar-
gaining is an instrument for industrial peace and coordination.  The 
common tripartite structure of union regulation in Europe and in 
many post-colonial nations developed macro-level variations in 
how, and through which institutions, unions were regulated—but 
the role of the state remained statistically central.37  As a result, in 
the context of labor regulation, a transition from state to societal cor-
poratism has been rare.  Only a few Scandinavian labor unions op-
erate outside of a formal system where they are directly sanctioned 
by the state as the formal bargaining representatives for workers.  
As such, labor corporatism continues to be a key feature of many 
varieties of capitalism,38 even after nations have transitioned to for-
mally non-corporatist political arrangements.39  Today the legiti-
macy of labor unions has some overt constitutional recognition, 
even in liberal constitutional regimes, as associative rights validated 
by the need for collective action.  It is thus not surprising that Mi-
chels used labor unions as a paradigmatic example of his iron rule.40  
For Michels the corporatist political ideas embedded in the 
                                               
35 DIETRICH ORLOW, THE HISTORY OF THE NAZI PARTY: 1919-1933 103 (1969); 
PAUL W. DRAKE, LABOR MOVEMENT AND DICTATORSHIPS: THE SOUTHERN CONE IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 192 (1996). 
36 Stephen McBride, Corporatism, Public Policy and the Labour Movement: A Com-
parative Study 33 POL. STUD. 439 (1985). 
37 For variations in state mechanisms for tripartite labor regulation, see Ralf 
Rogowski, Meso-Corporatism and Labour Conflict Resolution: The Theory and its Appli-
cation to the Analysis of Labour Judiciaries in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Great Britain and the United States, 1 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L.  & INDUS. REL, 143 (1985). 
38 PETER A. HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (2001); Kathleen Thelen, 
Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Soli-
darity, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 137 (2012). 
39 For the turn of the “Oxford school” of industrial relations to electoral poli-
tics following a loss of faith in democratic bargaining, see Ben Jackson, Economic 
Democracy and the Labour Tradition, JUNCTURE (May 22, 2014). 
40 MICHELS, supra note 28. 
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foundations of modern collective bargaining were not pathological, 
but desirable processes if labor unions were going to function 
properly as social bargainers. 
A full examination of European labor corporatism is not needed 
here, as, contrary to some external perceptions, the official recogni-
tion of the value of corporatism is traditionally more secure in Eu-
ropean labor discourse, if also under judicial and legislative as-
sault.41  Two of the most commonly cited examples by U.S. labor 
scholars as emulatable systems, German co-determination and Scan-
dinavia social unionism, operate without emphasizing the liberal 
procedural norms of union democracy.  German co-determination 
and most other forms of worker participation in corporate govern-
ance are, in fact, formally distinct from union governance,42  even if 
there is significant informal overlap.43 Additionally, it is notable that 
such attempts at intra-corporate participation have never fed into 
more radical social movements predicted by some of co-determina-
tion’s or universal unionism’s ideological opponents.44 
And while the relatively small scale of many Nordic countries 
may often give the appearance of greater participatory dynamics, 
most of these countries have traditionally been strong examples of 
extensive corporatist social bargaining tied to strong union discipli-
nary powers.45  The alignment of unions with political parties which 
took up the formal mantle of “Labor” has been increasingly uneasy 
in many countries; however, this has primarily been the result of 
more conservative economic ideologies emerging outside of labor 
unions rather than a result of changes in their internal organization. 
Intellectual resistance to recognizing Michels’ iron law by labor 
scholars or activists is often grounded in the hope that unions them-
selves would serve as a transitional compromise for more radical 
                                               
41 Wolfgang Streeck, Editorial Introduction to Special Issue on Organizational De-
mocracy in Trade Unions, 9 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 310 (1988). 
42 Ingo Schmidt, Can Germany's Corporatist Labor Movement Survive?, 57 
MONTHLY REV. 49 (2005). 
43 Ewan McGaughey, British Codetermination and the Churchillian Circle 
(UCL Lab. Rts. Inst. On-Line Working Papers, Working Paper No. 2, 2014); Walther 
Müller-Jentsch & Nicholas Levis, Industrial Democracy: From Representative Codeter-
mination to Direct Participation, 25 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 50 (1995). 
44 Ruth Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employment Relations, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 341, 
342 (2008); Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 689 
(2014). 
45 Arend Lijphart and Markus M. L. Crepaz, Corporatism and Consensus Democ-
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shifts toward reworking democratic norms into economic produc-
tion itself.46  Thus, the classic analytical dichotomy between the re-
quirements of institutional bureaucracy and member participation 
in unions is expressed as a subset of the general tension between 
democratic movements and democratic organizations.47  The ques-
tion of whether unions should themselves be internally democratic, 
and move away from their corporatist origins, has been debated 
across a wide range of nations.48 
These forward-looking and ideologically aspirational debates 
have been recurrently matched by comparative empirical analysis 
which establishes that union behavior and organization is consist-
ently driven by the corporatist desire to build political capital to ef-
fectively bargain at the social level.49  In general, these studies point 
out that it was far more costly for unions to bargain at the employer 
level, especially as capital acquires higher levels of concentration 
and more extensive abilities to arbitrage local and national condi-
tions.50  While unattractive to more utopian visions of labor activism, 
scholars in corporatist systems have had to recognize that centrality 
of power accumulation, rather than individual empowerment, is 
necessary for unions’ effective promotion of social democracy.51 
The least utopian implication of this accumulative function is the 
need for unions to be able to discipline workers as their collective 
agents.  Certainly, labor unions have had a difficulty truly represent-
ing the interests of all workers, especially those from minority 
groups, but the militancy that culminates in the organization of 
                                               
46 Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984); Mi-
chael Doherty, Corporatism or Cop-out? The Impact of Social Partnership on Union-
Member Relations (Dublin City U. Socio-Legal Res. Ctr. Working Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 01-07, 2007) (analyzing the Irish social partnership process and its 
relationship to union membership and workplace agreements). 
47 Richard Hyman, Union Renewal: A View from Europe, 45 LAB. HIST. 340 (2004); 
HEATHER CONNOLLY, RENEWAL IN THE FRENCH TRADE UNION MOVEMENT: A 
GRASSROOTS PERSPECTIVE (2010).  
48 Ulrich Mückenberger & Nicholas Levis, Trade Union Difficulties with Partici-
pation, 25 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 20 (1995). 
49 James A. Craft, Unions, Bureaucracy, and Change: Old Dogs Learn New Tricks 
Very Slowly, 4 J. LAB. RES. 393 (1991). 
50 Lars Calmfors & John Driffill, Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroe-
conomic Performance, 3 ECON. POL’Y 13 (1988). But see John Driffill, The Centralization 
of Wage Bargaining Revisited: What Have We Learnt? (Paper for The European Inst. of 
Lab., 2006) (discussing the effects of collective bargaining on macroeconomic per-
formance in growth and employment). 
51 S. Muthuchidambaram, Democracy as a Goal of Union Organization: An Inter-
pretation of the United States Experience, 3 INDUS. REL. 579, 586 (1969). 
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strikes, the lynchpin of unions’ ability to threaten industrial peace, 
requires the same sort of limited participation that still characterizes 
most political parties.  Union discipline and striking are thus inti-
mately intertwined, both to organize effective strikes and to limit 
strikes outside of the union control.  Even Otto Kahn Freund’s clas-
sic ideal of collective laissez-faire, which fully excluded the state 
from regulation of labor unions, was predicated on the need for un-
ions to be able to discipline their membership.52 And this discipline 
is not simply in regard to strikes, but bargaining power can be in-
creased through discipline of workers’ actions as voters and con-
sumers—as well as a way to compete with managerial discipline. 
As a result, the demands of collective bargaining led few sys-
tems to be remolded into internally democratic institutions where 
workers were actively engaged in electoral mechanisms or could 
make outside judicial claims against unions.  Systems that have at-
tempted to move toward greater local participation and less disci-
pline have led to the routine observation of the inefficiencies of lo-
calism in comparison to the strength of broader labor politics.53 
What is true is that the corporatist nature of labor unions imbues 
them with a decidedly conservative bend when it comes to more 
transformative visions of economic change.  The clearest example of 
this conservatism was the purging or marginalization of members 
sympathetic to communism in a number of nations, who themselves 
held out hope that unions could help stage communist revolutions.  
Perhaps more illustrative of the limits/demands of corporatist bar-
gaining is the beating back of Rudolf Meidner’s proposal for “wage-
earner funds” in Sweden during the 1970s.54  Here, as powerful and 
successful as Swedish unions are often portrayed internationally, 
the idea that share levies could lead to increasing levels of corporate 
ownership by unions was fiercely resisted by Sweden’s highly con-
centrated family owners.  The threat of this system-breaking tactic 
essentially led to the threat that the Swedish corporatist system 
                                               
52 Otto Kahn-Freund, Trade Union Democracy and the Law, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 10 
(1961); JOHN HEMINGWAY, CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY: STUDIES IN TRADE UNION 
GOVERNMENT (1978). See generally ADRIAN WILLIAMSON, CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC 
POLICYMAKING AND THE BIRTH OF THATCHERISM, 1964-1979, Ch. 5 (2015). 
53 See Guy Mundlak, Organizing Workers in ‘Hybrid Systems’: Comparing Trade 
Union Strategies in Four Countries – Austria, Germany, Israel and the Netherlands, 17 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 163 (2016) (explaining the gap that exists between local 
activism and social partnerships at higher levels). 
54 Philip Whyman, Post-Keynesianism, Socialisation of Investment and Swedish 
Wage-Earner Funds, 30 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 49 (2006). 
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would collapse through financial capital walking away from the 
bargaining table.55  The very cooperative logic that corporatism 
feeds on restricts the range of positions labor unions could take.  As 
such, unions have also generally stopped short of pushing partici-
patory dynamics into core aspects of enterprise decision-making be-
yond the consultative. 
As a result, while some labor scholars continue to imagine a re-
lationship between unions and more transformative versions of the 
workplace,56 hopes that unionization would lead to the growth of 
the more extensive forms of specific economic democracy,57 such as 
direct ownership or co-governance, have not materialized.  More 
successful have been calls for unions to participate in general eco-
nomic re-democratization under the rubric of social unionism, 
which is predicated on union participation to include non-economic 
issues of social justice, and to serve as social movements actors en-
gaged in politics far beyond the workplace.58 
 
2.2.  Social Capital Formation and the Authoritarian Workplace 
 
The anomie of labor scholars cited earlier is not primarily 
sourced in the relative failure of unions to promote specific forms of 
participatory economic democracy, but instead springs from the im-
pact of global economic and political trends on unions general effec-
tiveness to represent the interests of workers at any level.  In contrast 
to even the intermediary role of unions imagined under corporatist 
social theory, the ideal that workers or their representatives should 
play a role in state or corporate decision-making has become more 
difficult to realize in an environment where the very desirability of 
labor protections has been called into question. 
                                               
55 Magnus Henrekson and Ulf Jakobsson, Two Attacks on the Swedish Corporate 
Model: From Wage-Earner Funds to Corporatist Pension Funds, RESEARCHGATE (Feb. 
24th, 2003); Bengt Furåker, The Swedish Wage-Earner Funds and Economic Democracy: 
Is There Anything to be Learned From Them?, 22 EUR. REV. LAB. & RES. 121 (2016). 
56 Dionne M. Pohler & Andrew A. Luchak, Balancing Efficiency, Equity, and 
Voice: The Impact of Unions and High-Involvement Work Practices on Work Outcomes, 67 
INT’L LAB. REV. 1063 (2014). 
57 Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment 
Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 565-67 (1981). 
58 See Stephanie Ross, Social Unionism and Membership Participation: What Role 
for Union Democracy?, 81 STUD. POL. ECON. 129 (2008) (arguing that social unionism 
is not necessarily the solution to more expansive and inclusive labor movements).  
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A great deal of contemporary scholarship on labor markets in 
recent decades has promoted the ideal of “labor flexibilization,” 
which asserts that all labor protections hamper GDP growth, and 
labor unions as the greatest threat to economic productivity.59  Re-
lated but distinct from the traditional neoclassical idea that formal 
labor protection simply induces labor informalism, the flexibiliza-
tion discourse has found resonance in developed and developing 
countries alike, especially due to its popularity among international 
financial institutions.60  
The primarily efficiency-based arguments of flexibilization pro-
ponents is compounded by the continued, if not ever-strengthening, 
belief that democratic norms are inapposite to economic processes, 
including among corporate shareholders.61  The idea that economic 
decision-making, again outside of consumption, is too complex for 
workers to participate in also reinforces the notion that economic 
success is tied to exceptional individual meritocratic performance.62  
While some impetus exists for expanding worker participation in 
corporate governance through stakeholder theories,63 such theories 
have yet to be translated successfully into practice or reconciled with 
the quite divergent participatory logics of worker and shareholder 
democracy.64 The same holds true after the formal recognition of 
                                               
59 Jedidiah Kroncke, Precariousness as Growth: Meritocracy, Human Capital For-
mation, and Workplace Regulation in Brazil, China and India, 9 L. & DEV. REV. 321 (2016). 
60 Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development, 50 
VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 52 (2009). 
61 See Robin Blackburn, Economic Democracy: Meaningful, Desirable, Feasible?, 
136 DAEDALUS 36 (2007) (noting the general rise in director primacy in international 
corporate governance literature). 
62 See Bruce Baum, Governing ‘Democratic’ Equality: Mill, Tawney, and Liberal 
Democratic Governmentality, 65 POL. RES. Q. 714, 726 (2012). For a US-specific discus-
sion of the excision of democratic norms from even government action, see SABEEL 
RAHMAN, DOMINATION AGAINST DOMINATION (2016). 
63 Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Towards a Stakeholder 
Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067 (2008); 
Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043 
(2008) (dealing with the collective action problems of investments). See also Marleen 
O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB 
L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000) (looking at the American model of corporate governance 
where employees do not have much of a voice, and arguing that corporate govern-
ance rights for workers are necessary as shareholders). 
64 Michael J. Goldberg, Democracy in the Private Sector: The Rights of Shareholders 
and Union Members, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 393 (2015) (addressing corporate governance 
by comparing corporations and labor unions and the role of democracy in each). In 
fact, stakeholder theories of corporate governance are far closer to corporatist the-
ories of politics than liberal models. 
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norms of economic democracy in international treaties, such as the 
European Union’s Lisbon Treaty.65 
Moreover, such derogation of worker competency reflects a 
broader disenchantment with participatory aspects of political de-
mocracy manifest in debates about transnational financial regula-
tion and supranational political organization.66  Many developed 
nations are now in a historical fugue about the centrality of labor 
unions to their processes of democratic transformation and consoli-
dation.67  Such developments are further exacerbated by the efforts 
of politically authoritarian regimes to proactively and openly de-
limit the scope of democratic norms within international legal re-
gimes.68 
Dovetailing once more with the rapid growth of capital mobility 
and denationalization, the modern workplace thus finds itself sub-
ject to increasing capital arbitrage of international and sub-national 
variations in labor protections.  Thus, in countries with very differ-
ent political and social demographics there has been a convergent 
emphasis on contractualist labor norms69 and the proliferation of hy-
per-Taylorist management practices.  Workers increasingly enjoy 
limited individual privacy as well as speech rights in and outside of 
the workplace, alongside growing use of other forms of automated 
workplace monitoring.70  Elizabeth Anderson marked the rise of 
what she calls “private government” to convey how, in many cases, 
                                               
65 Niklas Bruun, Employees’ Participation Rights and Business Restructuring, 2 
EUR. LAB. L.J. 27 (2011). 
66 Victor V. Magagna, Representing Efficiency: Corporatism and Democratic The-
ory, 50 REV. OF POL. 420 (1988); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy and the 
Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002) (arguing that glob-
alization affects markets and leads to less democratic rights for individuals). 
67 HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002). 
68 Stephen F. Diamond, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Returns: China’s Challenge to the 
International Labor Movement, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 39 (2003). 
69 MARK FREEDLAND & NICOLA KOUNTOURIS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
PERSONAL WORK RELATIONS (2011); RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND 
THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT (Stone & Arthurs eds. 2013). 
70 See Chris Bertram, Let It Bleed: Libertarianism and the Workplace, Out of the 
Crooked Timber (Jul. 1, 2012), crookedtimber.org/2012/07/01/let-it-bleed-liber-
tarianism-and-the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/3F6H-USSB]. See also LEWIS 
MALTBY, CAN THEY DO THAT? (2009); Shelley Wallach, The Medusa Stare: Surveil-
lance and Monitoring of Employees and the Right to Privacy, 27 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & 
INDUS. REL. 189 (2011). 
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employers exert far greater regulatory power over the lives of their 
workers than any governmental agency.71 
This growth of authoritarian norms within global workplaces 
and reforms focused on atomistic conceptions of labor/capital inter-
actions has been resisted with varying degrees of success, but few 
evaluations of this resistance, perhaps outside of technological uto-
pianism, are brightly optimistic.72  The implications of these trends 
for social democracy are hotly debated today as a subset of debates 
over the sources of economic inequality.  Yet, these trends have been 
even more devastating for the realization of specific economic de-
mocracy in the form of workplace participation.  More radical vi-
sions of worker autonomy have generally been replaced with far 
milder calls for worker “voice” in corporate decision-making, much 
of which is framed in voluntary and consultative terms. 
These trends render individual workplaces as increasingly diffi-
cult and inhospitable loci for generating worker solidarity, what Da-
vid Weil calls the “fissured workplace.”73  Such dislocation and al-
ienation gives an ever-increasing advantage to employers over 
particularized or localized organizational tactics.74  Critics that argue 
that unions should themselves be internally democratic take for 
granted that more localized participation will generate greater social 
capital for a union to draw on. 
By contrast, such workplace alienation is compatible with cor-
poratist politics which looks to aggregate and discipline the interests 
of diverse workers who are called into collective action outside of 
the workplace. Focusing on individual workplaces asks workers to 
participate in action which most easily indentifies them for specific 
employer retaliation, rather than more diffuse striking and protest 
actions. Moreover, the very shared interests that workers share as a 
social class are obfuscated when their individual actions are cen-
tered in more localized identities, without direct interaction with or 
                                               
71 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR 
LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) (2017). 
72 KRONCKE, supra note 59, at 355. 
73 DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO 
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). Contra CYNTHIA ESTLUND, 
WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 
(2003). 
74 But see Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CAL. L. REV. 597 
(2016) (highlighting that the sociological premises of this argument are utopian, but 
it presents a useful entryway into thinking about how collective action can occur in 
systems which are traditionally organized at the enterprise level). 
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participation in broader union-organized actions. In this sense, one’s 
identity as a worker as employee can be as narrow as their atomizing 
identity as a consumer. 
Here, we should remember that Michels’ Iron Law, as any polit-
ical theory, constitutes a descriptive, not necessarily normative, the-
ory of power.  The inevitability of centralization and bureaucratiza-
tion of political democratic movements is as much a response to 
financial capital’s ability to agglomerate as it is a response to the 
general needs of large-scale action and hierarchy.  While this over-
generalizes the homogenous interests of financial capital and under-
plays its own coordination issues, it is key to remember the inher-
ently social nature of labor in its general dependence on consistently 
generating and utilizing social capital as the basis of its bargaining 
power.  
Social capital formation is generally a fragile, organic process, 
whose inner workings are consistently reviewed by modern social 
science.  Suffice it to say that even in formally democratic political 
systems with active civil society dynamics, it has been an ongoing 
challenge to create conditions conducive to its consistent produc-
tion.75  Part of this challenge is that while humans may thrive in high 
social capital settings, they are, on the whole, highly adverse cogni-
tively to conditions of uncertainty and social unpredictability inher-
ent in the commodification of labor.76 Therefore, processes of social 
capital formation that are organized around sites of wage-labor will 
never be able to keep pace with forms of financial capital formation 
that are far more agnostic to their fungible translation from one in-
stitutional setting to another.77  The fragmentation of the workplace, 
and thereby work itself, as a source of solidarity between workers 
beyond their general class interests refocuses the generation of social 
capital by unions into the more traditional collective venues imag-
ined by corporatist politics. 
Thus, while many studies have made strong claims about at-
tempts to revitalize unions through re-democratizing their internal 
structures, over longer time frames these revitalizations are revealed 
to be driven by the larger social movements which infused unions 
                                               
75 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN 
MODERN ITALY (1993). 
76 Carol Graham, Happiness and Uncertainty, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2010, 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/02/happiness_and_un-
certainty [https://perma.cc/565T-G4Q4]. 
77 John Peters, Labour Market Deregulation and the Decline of Labour Power in 
North America and Western Europe, 27 POL’Y & SOC’Y 83 (2008). 
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with social capital, rather than the reverse.  Unions have many vari-
eties of tools to engage and mobilize workers, but the legitimacy of 
this engagement has always been an interplay of performance and 
loyalty, rather than simple satisfaction with procedures of represen-
tation.  There is committed psychological literature related to the 
force of procedural justice or the effects of empowerment within so-
cial movements, but such studies rarely point to electoral accounta-
bility as a long-term generator of social capital.78 
Outside moments of acute crises, participation by individual 
workers in union management invariable wanes—even in compar-
atively active union systems.79  For unions, bargaining with financial 
capital makes internal dissensus crippling on an already compro-
mised terrain.  Instead, the ability of unions to promote political con-
solidation and effective representation of worker interests requires 
that they organize themselves as political actors and promote gen-
eral economic democracy as part of their external, not internal, ac-
tions.80  It is telling that labor movements which contribute critically 
to democratic political transitions often find their power greatly di-
minished if they do not succeed in acquiring corporatist status in the 
resulting regime.81 
Studies on smaller countries over short time frames often pre-
sent the appearance of local participatory action being integral to 
specific bargaining successes.  Perhaps Robert Putnam’s most con-
troversial claim regarding social capital formation is that it is easier 
                                               
78 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law, 
30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (discussing procedural justice); W. LANCE BENNETT & 
ALEXANDRA SEGERBERG, THE LOGIC OF CONNECTIVE ACTION: DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE 
PERSONALIZATION OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2013). See also Sandra González-Bailón, 
Networked Discontent: The Anatomy of Protest Campaigns, 44 SOC. NETWORKS 95 (2016) 
(discussing further the limitations of individualized action for new social move-
ments). 
79 Compare Michael Lynk, Union Democracy and the Law in Canada, 21 J. LAB. 
RES. 37 (2001) (suggesting that greater legal intervention in labor unions may ensure 
membership control and participation by regulating democratic behavior), with 
Jonathan Eaton & Anil Verma, Does "Fighting Back" Make a Difference?: The Case of 
the Canadian Auto Workers Union, 27 J. LAB. RES. 187 (2006) (arguing that organiza-
tion, political action, and collective bargaining can also help revitalize labor un-
ions). 
80 Barbara J. Fick, Not Just Collective Bargaining: The Role of Trade Unions in Cre-
ating and Maintaining a Democratic Society, 12 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 249 (2009). 
81 Eva Bellin, Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in 
Late-Developing Countries, 52 WORLD POL. 175, 180–81 (2000). 
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under conditions of social uniformity.82  The dynamics in small, rel-
atively homogenous countries where social capital formation is eas-
ier to consistently generate provides a deceptively hopeful compar-
ison for geographically and demographically diverse countries.83  
Moreover, almost every study pointing to a success in local democ-
ratization in small countries can be matched by a longitudinal study 
revealing that even here, centralization is the far more durable arti-
fact of labor mobilizations.84 
Larger, comparatively homogenous, countries have to rely on 
intense cultural pressures to maintain labor representation over 
time.85  The rise and fall of Australia’s movement for industrial bar-
gaining reflects this general dynamic, as well as the difficulties pre-
sent in strong federalist systems that inherently fragment the scale 
of bargaining.86  Still, small size or social homogeneity is not neces-
sarily a panacea, as it also provides advantages to authoritarian ac-
tors, such as in Singapore, perhaps the most successful example of 
unionism as labor coordination institution,87 and Vietnam, which 
has felt freer to allow union strike experimentation than its larger 
communist and semi-authoritarian cohort.88  Among countries 
which possess strong union movements post-democratic transition, 
                                               
82 Robert Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, 30 SCAN. POL. STUD. 137 (2007) (discussing 
the short and long terms effects of immigration and ethnic diversity, and stating 
that in the short run, these factors reduce social capital and social diversity). 
83 See Inyi Choi, Creating Union Democracy, Workers' Consciousness and Solidar-
ity: Decision-Making Process, Election, and Education in Korean Unions (U.C. Irvine 
Center for the Study of Democracy and Development Paper Series, 2005); Itai 
Svirski, Moving to Bottom-Up Representation, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 915 (2011) 
(discussing trade union systems in Israel). 
84 Compare Andrienne Eaton & Kill Kriesky, Decentralization of Bargaining Struc-
tures, 2 INDUS. REL. 1 (1998) (discussing and applying the forces that determine bar-
gaining structure), with Lucio Baccaro, Centralized Wage Bargaining and the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’ Phenomenon, 46 INDUS. REL. 426 (2007) (discussing centralized wage bargain-
ing and its influence on the Irish growth). 
85 Dennis McNamara, Corporatism and Cooperation among Japanese Labor, 28 
COMP. POL. 379 (1996); Kenneth Dau-Schmidt & Benjamin Ellis, The Relative Bargain-
ing Power of Employers and Unions in the Global Information Age, in ENTERPRISE L. 81 
(Zenichi Shishido ed., 2010). 
86 See Bradley Bowden, The Rise and Decline of Australian Unionism, 100 LAB. 
HIST., 50 (2011); Mark Barenberg, Constitutional Constraints on Redistribution Through 
Class Power, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 313 (1999). 
87 Chris Leggett, Trade Unions in Singapore: Corporatist Paternalism, in TRADE 
UNIONS IN ASIA: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 102 (Benson & Zhu eds., 
2008); Chew Beng & Rosalind Chew, A New Form of Union Representation to Meet the 
Challenges of a Globalized World (Paper, 16th ILERA World Congress, 2012). 
88 Anita Chan, Strikes in China’s Export Industries in Comparative Perspective, 65 
CHINA J. 27 (2011). 
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it is their ultimate strength relative to other social actors that drives 
their success rather than any specific internal democratic features,89 
and most acute when able to lead to the formation of a specific labor 
party. 
The issue of scale and social capital formation also helps explain 
the disappointing track record of transnational labor organizing.90  
Even when labor rights have been conceptualized as human rights,91 
the recurrent challenge of disciplining diverse worker interests is 
replicated exponentially in transnational labor organizing.92  While 
no doubt inhibited by the marginalization of class as an organization 
framed by the international NGO community,93 it is nonetheless true 
that few national unions have taken large risks for international 
partners.94  Labor organizations rarely find abroad what they cannot 
find in their own states.95  In the European Union, the progress that 
has been made in constructing a regional labor regime has worked 
not through democratic processes, but through corporatist pro-
cesses.96  
If we return to the global discourse on labor flexibilization, we 
can find the unsurprising result that labor flexibilization reforms 
have hit countries that lack corporatist labor regimes the hardest.97  
                                               
89 Yoonkyung Lee, Labor's Political Representation, in WORKING THROUGH THE 
PAST (Teri Caraway et al. eds, 2015). 
90 See Mark Barenberg, Sustaining Workers’ Bargaining Power in an Age of 
Globalization (EPI Institute Briefing Papers, Paper No. 246, 2009); TRANSNATIONAL 
COOPERATION AMONG LABOR UNIONS (Gordon & Turner eds., 2000) (presenting 
transnational cooperation among labor unions as effective weapon against the ex-
ploitation of workers); JAMIE MCCALLUM, GLOBAL UNIONS, LOCAL POWER: THE NEW 
SPIRIT OF TRANSNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZING (2013) (examining an important cam-
paign by the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) in 2007). 
91 PHILIP ALSTON, LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (2005). 
92 CARSTEN ECKEL, THE DILEMMA OF LABOR UNIONS: LOCAL OBJECTIVES VS. 
GLOBAL BARGAINING (2011). 
93 See, e.g., Joseph Roman, The Trade Union Solution or the NGO Problem?, 14 
DEV. IN PRAC. 100 (2004). 
94 See Dean Frutiger, AFL-CIO China Policy: Labor’s New Step Forward or The 
Cold War Revisited?, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 67 (2002) (discussing the dynamic between 
China’s trade relations with other countries and with international entities such as 
the WTO and World Bank given its human rights record).  
95 PAUL BUCHANAN, STATE, LABOR, CAPITAL (1987). 
96 Tonia Novitz & Phil Syrpis, Assessing Legitimate Structures for the Making of 
Transnational Labour Law, 35 IND. L.J. 367 (2006). 
97 See Kevin Kolben, Transnational Labor Regulation and the Limits of Governance, 
12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 403 (2011) (suggesting that transitional labor regulation may 
be achieved by an integrated approach that coupled governance theory with devel-
oping state capacity for a comparative advantage); Baldur Thorhallsson and Rainer 
Kattel, Neo-Liberal Small States and Economic Crisis, 44:1 J. BALTIC STUD. 83 (2012) 
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We can see this dynamic illustrated in tandem by the experience of 
Mexico, where critiques of the oligopic, undemocratic nature of un-
ions were popular,98 but subsequently absent after de-corporatiza-
tion reforms ultimately led not to a renewed labor movement, but 
simply to greater subjection to workplace authoritarianism.99 
But such focus on corporatist politics raises the question of ex-
actly how labor unions gain the loyalty of workers and motivate 
them to participate in collective action, if not through direct election 
or decertification.  On the level of institutional design this may be 
through making unions as broad and undemocratic as possible.  
Many European labor unions that are still active politically are fi-
nanced through mandatory due payments by sectors of workers 
who may only interact with their union representatives during times 
of strikes.  The Scandinavian examples represent, even when fully 
deregulated by the state, highly concentrated corporatist actors with 
no formal mechanisms of electoral accountability.100 
The ability of such unions to gain legitimacy and maintain loy-
alty is then completely driven by a combination of general faith that 
unions are loyal to workers demonstrated by economic and political 
outcome performance.  Other design elements, such as a devolving 
provision of social welfare subsidies to unions, can strengthen these 
linkages, but there is little sustained cross-national evidence that a 
specific lack of participatory legitimacy weakens high-performing 
unions.101  Labor politics are ultimately sustained by the same prin-
ciples that spur and sap social/political movements more broadly, 
and can be facilitated or delimited, but never fully determined, by 
particular issues of institutional design. While elections seem like a 
                                               
(arguing that corporatist features play an important role in a country’s survival 
during a neo-liberal era). 
98 Jorge Ventura de Morais, Rejane Medeiros and Luis Esparza Source, México 
Dinámica de la Política Interna del "Nuevo" Sindicalismo Brasileño, 59 REV. MEX. DE SOC. 
205 (1997). 
99 See Andra Miljanic, Union-Party Links and the Reconfiguration of the La-
bor Movement: Brazil and Mexico (2010) (Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley), 
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/con-
tent/qt2144t6bs/qt2144t6bs.pdf?t=mtfvgy [https://perma.cc/E63R-P3UR] (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2018) (looking at the reconfiguration of labor movements in Latin 
America, particularly within the automotive industry, and the link between labor 
unions and political parties);  Trudie Coker, Globalization and Corporatism, 60 INT’L 
LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 180 (2001) (discussing the historical development of 
Venezuela’s labor forces). 
100 Matthew Dimick, Paths to Power, 50 N.C. L. REV. 473, 476-27 (2012). 
101 Id. This is also a key lesson of the comparative example of Brazil discussed 
below, infra (Section 4.). 
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natural form of accountability in political democracies, the limits of 
elections as such has been well-explored in recent decades, and 
elides the possibility that wide-spread worker resistance to union 
discipline is far from indicative of genuine problems in representa-
tion than individual workplace elections or individual judicial chal-
lenges. 
In turn, simply creating a formally corporatist systems is no 
guarantee of such worker loyalty.  It must be earned through social 
engagement and programming, but cannot be simply designed.  The 
post-communist experience in Eastern Europe is indicative of a 
wide-range of possible worker viewpoints on unions in such sys-
tems.  David Ost has called many of the post-Soviet systems varia-
tions of “illusory corporatism.”102  Russia’s state union survived de-
mocratization and it claims to be in social partnership with the 
current regime; however, in part reflecting the general failure of 
worker oriented reforms,103 it currently has one of the lowest global 
rates of social legitimacy.104  The fate of labor in most post-Soviet 
countries has depended on the actual bargaining power of corporat-
ist unions,105 the weakest of which are those organized around en-
terprise level bargaining.106  
 
2.3.  Union Democracy and the Comparative Historical Frame 
 
It is in this general theoretical and empirical context that this ar-
ticle seeks to make its contribution.  It does so by placing in a com-
parative historical frame three nationally large and globally signifi-
cant labor union systems – those of the United States, Brazil, and 
                                               
102 David Ost, 'Illusory Corporatism' Ten Years Later, 2 WARSAW F. ECON. SOC. 
19 (2011). 
103 Joel Moses, Worker Self-Management and the Reformist Alternative in Soviet 
Labour Policy, 39 SOVIET STUD. 205 (1987). 
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STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 62, 82 (2006); Tim Pringle, Trade Union Reform in Russia and 
China, in CHINESE WORKERS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 210 (Anita Chan ed., 2015). 
105 Paul Kubicek, Civil Society, Trade Unions and the Political Economy of Post-
communist Transformation in ORGANIZED LABOR IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES: FROM 
SOLIDARITY TO INFIRMITY (Kubicek, 2004). 
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China.  Each union system represents quite different, if at times in-
terrelated, historical trajectories. 
The relative parochialism of U.S. labor scholarship is one of the 
reasons it has remained uniquely preoccupied with the promotion 
of union democracy as salve for union weakness, with U.S. labor 
scholars openly celebrating union democracy as a universally held 
value.107 As discussed in depth later, these calls fundamentally 
shape proposed agendas for union revitalization and reform in the 
U.S., with even harsh critics of the current system focusing on union 
electoral processes as the motor force for stimulating a grassroots 
revival of the labor movement.108  Moreover, while U.S. labor schol-
arship and the concept of union democracy are not unknown in Eu-
rope, the comparative impact of U.S. scholarship is much stronger 
across the general asymmetries of international academia and policy 
discourse.  In this case, while far from determinative of union dis-
course in Brazil or China, threads of the union democracy literature 
in U.S. scholarship have given rise to its presence in those countries’ 
discourses and also help prefigure, for the worst, comparative anal-
ysis of those systems by U.S. scholars. 
In contrast, comparative examination of the modern labor histo-
ries of each country reinforces the notion that corporatism is the 
state of affairs to which all labor unions hew, even if the formal legal 
design of their systems is quite different.  Moreover, the solidarities 
that such corporatism requires to work in practice makes it a desir-
able structural dynamic from the perspective of social democracy.  
This common development pattern is significant precisely because 
these three countries represent distinct political regimes and span 
the two primary axes of labor union formation: from public to pri-
vate aegis, and from sectoral to enterprise organization.  The United 
States is an established liberal democracy whose decentralized sys-
tem of private unionization ideally operates at the enterprise level.  
Brazil is a young social democracy with a centralized system of 
                                               
107 George Strauss, Union Democracy, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 201 (George 
Strauss et al. eds., 1991) (“That unions should be democratic almost everyone 
agrees.”). See also Catherine Fisk, Workplace Democracy and Democratic Worker Organ-
izations, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 101, 169 (2016). 
108 See Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 247 
(2000) (arguing that union democracy regulation is ineffective and counterproduc-
tive); Michael Goldberg, Derailing Union Democracy, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
137 (2002) (reviewing Estreicher’s propositions as incorrect in that unions are not 
strictly economic entities and the current regulatory scheme as not necessarily in-
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formally private but hyper-corporatist unionization.  And China is 
governed by a modern bureaucratic authoritarian regime with a 
state union structure which is trying to promote industrial peace 
through an informal corporatization of labor politics.  In each of 
these systems, aspects of their general political logics are under 
stress, but these stresses reinforce the general corporatist principles 
herein argued for. 
As in any area of law, the granularity of comparative legal anal-
ysis suffers when global trends are at issue.  For each point in this 
triadic analysis there are points of convergence and divergence that 
will be elided.  However, as stated earlier, given the state of eco-
nomic globalization, comparative legal analysis is both empirically 
necessary109 and the best disruptive intervention for spurring na-
tional labor intellectuals to escape intellectual and strategic ossifica-
tion.  Parochialism is in some sense necessary for understanding the 
cultural frameworks required to communicate effectively with 
workers and build social solidarity, but it also encourages the ten-
dency to pursue narrow tactical solutions to those that are in mod-
ern labor politics.110 
Fortunately, the methodological sophistication of labor studies 
has progressed significantly in recent decades, applying empirical 
techniques—ethnographic,111 historical,112 and statistical113—to 
move beyond the belabored laments of traditional comparative legal 
formalism or cultural over-determination.  The relevance of compar-
ative legal experience in labor law cannot be ignored on almost any 
facet of labor research which presumes to be honestly engaged in a 
search for novel solutions.  For those committed to notions of eco-
nomic democracy, the comparative analysis presented herein is 
meant not as another biting wound, but as a way to help face the 
harsher reality that some old battles, no matter the emotional or in-
tellectual energy hereto committed, have to be retasked. 
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110 Harry Arthurs, Compared to What? The UCLA Comparative Labor Law Project 
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3.  CORPORATISM AS INFORMAL ASPIRATION IN U.S.  LABOR UNIONS 
 
3.1.  U.S.  Labor from Republican Radicalism to Corporatist Peace 
 
In many ways, the modern structure of union organization and 
regulation in the United States is the exception that proves the cor-
poratist rule.  In contrast to bargaining structures that emerged out 
of social democratic movements in Europe or post-authoritarian and 
post-colonial regimes elsewhere, the legal formalization of U.S. la-
bor unions in 1935 followed a distinctly decentralized vision of labor 
union formation and operation.  It became one of the few union sys-
tems that formally set bargaining agents at the enterprise level—be-
tween individual employers and a single, exclusive union formed 
by its employees.  Moreover, the type of social bargaining that de-
fined corporatist political process elsewhere was explicitly barred, 
limited to an enumerated list of wage and benefits questions and 
accompanied by a ban on any form of intra-corporate participatory 
representation. 
This particular and relatively exceptional form was the out-
growth of decades of struggle to reconcile U.S. ideals of a republican 
government with the dislocations of industrialization.114 From the 
outset, finding a place for labor unions in U.S. law faced the hurdle 
of the common law’s traditional adherence to notions of contractual 
equality and preference for private ordering of economic affairs.115  
Thus, much employer resistance to labor organization in the early 
American industrial era was formally articulated through legal chal-
lenges to labor organization as a form of combinatory conspiracy.116  
Up until 1935, even when unions succeeded in discrete moments of 
bargaining with employers, there was little clarity as to how and un-
der what doctrinal categories collective agreements would be 
                                               
114 ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH 
(2015); Anna di Robilant, Populist Property Law, 49 CONN. L. REV. 936 (2017) (empha-
sizing that ordinary people can become participants in the creation of property law, 
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115 JOHN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLE WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE 
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enforced under existing U.S. law.117  General judicial hostility, along 
with the traditional private self-help of employers and their political 
allies,118 were initially matched by quite radical critiques of wage-
labor which sought to challenge worker subordination economically 
and politically.119  None of these movements were able to success-
fully institutionalize themselves as a labor party within U.S. politics, 
and bitter internecine conflicts expressed key divergence as to what 
a particularly American labor movement should represent. 
Central to these conflicts was the extent to which class conflict 
was at the heart of different labor visions.  This divergence is classi-
cally analogized to the competing philosophies of Samuel Gompers 
and Eugene Debs, with the former’s conciliatory “business union-
ism” contrasted with the latter’s more radical vision of industrial de-
mocracy.120  Reading the labor debates of this era through the lens of 
union democracy is difficult, as political-economic thinking was 
roundly focused on the issue of remediating the social and political 
status of employer power.121  Yet, the practical legal issue always 
remained as to how any particular labor vision would be entrenched 
in U.S. law given its lack of a specific constitutional provision. 
It was not until the administration of Franklin Roosevelt reacted 
to the Great Depression that unions were presented with a genuine 
opportunity to gain formal legal and political endorsement.122  Dur-
ing World War II, FDR had attempted to pass legislation, notably 
the National Recover Administration (NRA), to more openly coor-
dinate industrial and worker interests.  The Supreme Court ruling 
that the NRA was unconstitutional highlighted the resistance of 
American liberal legal thought to the group democratic logic of 
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corporatism that had then become entrenched in Europe.123  The de-
feat of the NRA prompted a constitutional crisis over the role of the 
Supreme Court in reviewing economic legislation, and ultimately 
FDR was undeterred.  Drawing in part on fears that social unrest 
surrounding the Great Depression could empower calls for Euro-
pean-style socialism, Roosevelt subsequently advanced a series of 
social reforms dubbed the New Deal as a solution to economic stag-
nation and industrial conflict. 
The resulting passage of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) in 1935, while still contested by the Republican Party and 
most business interests, was explicitly infused with notions of pro-
cedural liberalism absent from its European analogs.  Drawing on 
Gomper’s more conciliatory view of employer/employee relation-
ships, the NLRA enshrined a labor vision where economic produc-
tion within individual companies resulted in profits that could then 
be allocated through a bargaining process, whose proper function-
ing could itself facilitate what Kenneth Dau-Schmidt calls the “co-
operative surplus.”124  At the same time, this bargaining process 
would ideally facilitate a type of implicit psychological contract be-
tween individual owners and workers that would appropriately re-
spect dignitary claims regarding workplace management.125 
Many U.S. politicians and intellectuals had been drawn to ideas 
about labor corporatism then popular in Europe, especially given 
that corporatism was then articulated as a pathway to achieve both 
industrial peace and systematically organize the allocation of la-
bor.126  Yet, James Whitman has detailed how in the U.S., in contrast 
to the European experience which saw industrial peace as a resolu-
tion of class conflict, this corporatist view of group bargaining was 
re-cast as an expression of liberal democracy,127 with the aim of 
                                               
123 See Jeffrey Haydu, MAKING AMERICAN INDUSTRY SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY 93 
(1997). 
124 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and 
the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 424 (1992). 
125 See generally Denise M. Rousseau, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS IN 
ORGANIZATIONS: UNDERSTANDING WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN AGREEMENTS (1995). 
126 See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, 
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1454-55 (1993) (explaining that 
collective empowerment became an important tool to elicit workers’ sense of re-
sponsibility for efficient operations and provide discipline when individuals de-
tracted from the group’s interests). 
127 See James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39 
AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 774-75 (1991) (describing that unlike Europeans, Americans 
never perceived class warfare as a defining political problem within society). 
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creating a private system of welfare as an alternative to the public 
welfare states emerging in Europe.128 
During the 1930s, the reception of labor corporatism from Eu-
rope was mediated by the influx of European intellectual émigrés 
fleeing fascism and communism.  These intellectuals were influen-
tial in part by providing an account of labor organization that would 
be distinguishable from that which operated under these anti-liberal 
regimes, and this representation helped them appear relevant to a 
genuinely American political conversion.  Many of these émigrés 
had originally placed their hope that European labor unions would 
be a pathway to greater socialism, and then had to translate their 
arguments for American audiences.129  Franz Neumann was per-
haps best known for his attempt to reconcile liberal legalism with 
economic corporatism, helping to popularize the substitute notion 
of “industrial pluralism.”130  Though some debate exists over the in-
fluence of these particular thinkers on U.S. labor regulation, they 
clearly present the need to repackage even formally corporatist 
ideas into the American political milieu.131 
The U.S. system was still formally one of state corporatism given 
that the NLRA, or Wagner Act, established the electoral procedures 
that employees at an individual enterprise needed to follow in order 
to enjoy legal recognition for a union as well as specific regulations 
of the bargaining process—all in exchange for state enforcement of 
collective bargains.  The regime was regulated through a then novel 
grant of legal power to an American federal administrative agency, 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  The focus on the 
NLRB’s oversight was the integrity of the electoral process that cer-
tified unions and to ensure that both unions’ and employees’ 
                                               
128 See Nelson Lichtenstein, STATE OF THE UNION (2002). 
129 See generally Alfred Kähler, The Trade Union Approach to Economic Democ-
racy, in POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (Max Ascoli & Fritz Lehmann eds., 
1937); Gerhard Colm, Is Economic Planning Compatible with Democracy?, in POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 21 (Max Ascoli & Fritz Lehmann eds., 1937). 
130 Franz Neumann, ON THE PRECONDITIONS AND LEGAL CONCEPT OF AN 
ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1931); Franz Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law 
in Modern Society, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN STATE: ESSAYS IN 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY (Herbert Marcuse ed., 1957). 
131 Compare Matthew W. Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23, 
88-90 (1984) (discussing the work of Karl Klare, who despite disagreeing with the 
labor organization system in the U.S., celebrates the intellectual elites who formu-
lated it), with Reuel Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor 
Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 12-
14 (1999) (explaining that American political thinkers belonged to too many interest 
groups to be considered members of any single “class”). 
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bargaining tactics fell within the delimited scope laid out in the 
NLRA.  Critically, this concern with procedural democracy was re-
stricted to union formation itself, and through its regulation of the 
topics and tactics collective bargaining process, the NLRA enforced 
the wage and benefit focus of Gompers in contrast to labor leaders 
who wanted unions to participate in corporate decision-making.  
The NLRA also cut out huge swaths of workers, as it sanctioned un-
ions only for its definition of non-supervisory workers, and omitted 
most agricultural labor.132 
The NLRA’s designation of the workplace as a microcosm of po-
litical democracy was held out politically to labor organizations as 
rejecting the distinction between economic and political democ-
racy.133  Such institutionalization was still resisted by a range of un-
convinced existing labor organizations,134 many of whom wanted to 
avoid the requirement of formal state certification and saw the lim-
itation on bargaining topics as too complete a concession over the 
role of democratic norms in the workplace itself.  Yet, the weakening 
of the labor movement in the early 1930s paved the way for general 
acquiescence to the Wagner Act in relatively short order. 
Even with this particularly decentralized and procedurally-ori-
ented view of collective bargaining, from the outset of the NLRA, 
regime labor unions struggled to find sustained acceptance within 
the U.S. legal and political culture.  What was, in practice, a func-
tional political bargain that lacked a particular constitutional foun-
dation, subjected it to easy legislative and judicial revision.135  There 
were continuous arguments advanced that the collective action of 
labor unions violated norms of U.S. liberty and individualism.  De-
fenders of unionization disagreed but they did so in consonant ide-
ological terms,136 or made recourse to more inchoate invocations of 
                                               
132 See generally Jean-Christian Vinel, THE EMPLOYEE: A POLITICAL HISTORY 
(2013). 
133 See Katherine van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor 
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (identifying the “industrial pluralism” model, which 
shaped the collective bargaining process towards a legislative system with political 
representation and democratic participation); Clyde W. Summers, From Industrial 
Democracy to Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 1, 4-5 (2000). 
134 Christopher L. Tomlins, AFL Unions in the 1930s: Their Performance in His-
torical Perspective, 65 J. AMER. HIST. 1021 (1979). 
135 See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 169 (2015) (noting the relative flexibility and ease with which U.S. legislature 
and courts could shape labor relations). 
136 See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A Democratic Labor Policy, 7 L. GUILD REV. 6 
(1947) (describing the labor movement’s decision to seek advancement through 
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“economic nationalism” popular during times of war.137  The partic-
ular historical aperture that allowed Roosevelt to pass the NLRA 
and avoid annulment by the Supreme Court was, in retrospect, ex-
ceptional.138 
While the U.S. government would promote this regime of collec-
tive bargaining as an expression of liberal democracy in the work-
place abroad for decades —especially in its post-World War II re-
construction projects,139 broad social and legal hostility to unions 
would persist and grow in the following decades.140  As a result, the 
vision of labor corporatism used to initially justify the NLRA would 
rarely come to fruition in practice.141  However, the institutionaliza-
tion of labor unions did serve to eventually sideline more radical 
visions within the labor movement,142 as symbolized by the merger 
of the AFL and CIO in 1955.143  
 
 
                                               
existing political channels); Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of 
American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1970) (detailing the United States’ path 
towards the development of a unique labor relations, collective bargaining, and 
trade unionism system); Thomas C. Kohler, The Notion of Solidarity and the Secret 
History of American Labor Law, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 883 (2005) (discussing the shaping of 
the American labor system by existing norms around the understanding of “liber-
ties” and “solidarity”). 
137 See William Hard, National Policy Toward Labor, 224 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 152 (1943) (advocating for the development of “economic patriotism,” 
which requires active collaboration among labor to achieve national advancement). 
138 See Whitman, supra note 127; Jefferson Cowie, Reframing the New Deal: The 
Past and Future of American Labor and the Law, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 13 (2016) 
(identifying the period from 1935 to 1973 as a “long exception” to a sustained pat-
tern of legal hostility to labor organizing in the United States). 
139 See generally Anthony Carew, LABOUR UNDER THE MARSHALL PLAN: THE 
POLITICS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND THE MARKETING OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (1987); 
AMERICAN LABOR AND THE COLD WAR: GRASSROOTS POLITICS AND POSTWAR POLITICAL 
CULTURE (Robert W. Cherny et al. eds., 2004). 
140 See generally Christopher L. Tomlins, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR 
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 
(1985); Robert J. Watt, Collective Bargaining as a Basis for Labor Co-Operation, 224 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.  84 (1942). 
141 See Michael L Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competi-
tive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 604, 612 (2007) (describing that neither manage-
ment nor labor wanted to adopt and implement labor corporatist ideals). 
142 For an attempt to recover some of this earlier history today, see Gourevitch, 
supra note 114. 
143 See Judith Stepan-Norris & Maurice Zeitlin, Union Democracy, Radical Lead-
ership, and the Hegemony of Capital, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 829 (1995). 
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3.2.  Legal Deradicalization Amid Failed Corporatism 
 
The rise and fall of the influence of American labor unions after 
the Wagner Act is one that has been retold many times, with the turn 
to Gompers’ more depoliticized vision of collective bargaining seen 
by more critical scholars as something akin to an original sin.144  Yet, 
one aspect of this history often taken for granted was how, almost 
instantly, union mergers and coordination beyond individual work-
places became the core dynamics of union activity.  Even though en-
terprise-level union affiliation with larger union organizations, such 
as the AFL-CIO, was purely voluntary in the NLRA scheme, in prac-
tice, the strength of the labor movement was always recognized as 
lying in its potential for collective solidarity.  Attempts to utilize col-
lective labor power emerged with tactics such as “whipsawing,” 
“fractional bargaining,” or “pattern bargaining,” all of which were 
some variations of replicating and leveraging collective bargains 
across various industries.145  Through union mergers and these col-
lective tactics, union leaders aggressively aspired to the type of po-
litical influence enjoyed by their European counterparts - thus, the 
label “aspirational corporatism.” 
Following the dynamics outlined by Michel’s iron law, Ameri-
can unions de facto pursued corporatism in practice.  As a result, 
while the decentralized Wagner system ideally represented a vic-
tory for liberal procedural norms, the type of democracy at stake 
was ever-contested.  Almost every judicial and legislative assault on 
unions was made by attacking the strategies and tactics that would 
transform voluntary union mergers into real collective, corporatist 
power.146  While calls for greater internal union democracy would 
later become a rallying cry for activists sympathetic to the labor 
                                               
144 See Christopher L. Tomlins, The New Deal, Collective Bargaining, and the Tri-
umph of Industrial Pluralism, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 19, 20 (1988) (discussing the 
development of labor laws to “integrate the labor movement into the mainstream 
contours of pressure-group politics and to institutionalize, regulate, and thereby 
dampen industrial conflict.”); George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The 
Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187 (1994) (explaining that 
labor’s challenge collapsed due to the traditional hostility that they received in 
courts for challenging fundamental societal institutions). 
145 For a discussion of these tactics in the U.S., and their decline in comparative 
frame, see Margaret Goralski et al., International Difference in Labor Conflicts, 6 J. BUS. 
MANAG. & CHANGE 75 (2011). 
146 See Joel Seidman, Democracy in Labor Unions, 61 J. POL. ECON. 221, 231 (1953). 
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movement, it was much more effectively wielded as a weapon by 
critics of unionization. 
The Wagner Act initially gave little attention to the internal af-
fairs of unions once they were formed.  Yet, this relative freedom 
was short lived.  Judicial doctrine had already begun to develop 
prior to the 1930s, limiting union discipline of workers.147  The pas-
sage of the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947, popularly 
known as the Taft-Hartley Act, placed greater procedural re-
strictions on union bargaining, as did the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959.  The LMRDA, popularly known 
as the Landrum-Griffin Act, was explicitly justified on the basis of 
promoting union democracy in the wake of a variety of union cor-
ruption scandals.148  These new legislative actions were a response 
to how quickly unions had grown in influence by centralizing their 
operations.  The relative success of the AFL-CIO merger fueled ar-
guments that labor unions were powerful enough to oppress other 
legitimate social interests.149  It was further true that in union work-
places, dissenting workers were often left with little legal recourse 
or voice when faced with individual miscarriages of justice,150 
though exceptions like that did persist at the local level.151 
In 1956, Lipset, Trow and Coleman’s work on the decentralized 
and democratically vibrant International Typographical Union held 
                                               
147 See Miller D. Steever, Control of Labor through Union Discipline, 16 CORNELL 
L.Q. 212 (1931). 
148 See Kurt L. Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 
CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959) (describing legal restrictions placed upon membership 
rights within unions); Clyde W. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 
25 MOD. L. REV. 273 (1962) (detailing the extensive investigative efforts spent to-
wards identifying union corruption and improper practices in the field of labor 
management relations). 
149 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Group Interests in Labor Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 
432, 482 (1958) (articulating the belief that labor organizations had become so pow-
erful that legal measures would have to be taken to ensure protection against their 
influence). 
150 See Clyde W. Summers, Legal Limitation on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. 
REV. 1049 (1950) (highlighting that union discipline represents a double-edged 
sword as it is both necessary for union effectiveness but may be a tool of oppres-
sion); Paul H. Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His 
Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 55 (1972) (exploring union-employee relations through the 
case of an employee who the union refuses to represent in his wrongful discharge 
arbitration). 
151 See, e.g., Lon W. Smith, An Experiment in Trade Union Democracy: Harold 
Gibbons and the Formation of Teamsters Local 688, 1937-1957 (Dec. 1993) (un-
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the ITU as a validation of the promise of unions as bottom-up gen-
erators of democratic civil society and was written as an open coun-
terpoint to Michel’s iron law.152  Most U.S. labor scholars were sym-
pathetic to critiques of insufficient participatory norms within 
unions regardless of their effectiveness as collective bargainers, of-
ten directly criticizing, à la Gerald Frug, the necessity of bureaucratic 
norms and processes on efficiency grounds.153  Many openly 
claimed that union membership had grown exactly because of their 
particularly American internally democratic nature and their conso-
nance with norms of individual democratic rights,154 and even the 
localism of U.S. federalism.155 
Yet, the impact of Taft-Hartley and the LMRD was not a reinvig-
oration of the democratic potential of unions, but central to the on-
going judicial assault on the collective tools that unions relied on to 
simulate corporatist dynamics, such as sympathy strikes.  These de-
velopments placed pro-union democracy activists in the awkward 
position of finding their loyalty to the large union movement ques-
tioned.156 
The scholarship of Clyde Summers, key contributor to the 
Landrum-Griffin Act, would for decades try to reconcile this com-
mitment to union democracy with the progressive weakening of the 
labor movement.157  Summers’ exchanges with Archibald Cox dur-
ing this era often circled around the role of union discipline in 
                                               
152 Though often cited as a pure counter-point to Michels, Lipset, Trow and 
Coleman recognized the risk that a more localized union culture would distract 
from larger issues of worker interest.  See Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow & 
James Coleman, UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INSIDE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 431-32 (1956). 
153 Frug noted that his general critique of bureaucracy necessity applied to 
workplace dynamics.  See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American 
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1278 n.29 (1983). 
154 See Seidman, supra note 146 (explaining that American labor organizations 
garnered support by adhering to democratic representative ideals); Hanslowe, su-
pra note 148, (highlighting that labor participation depended, in large part, on un-
ions’ concessions over absolute discipline ideologies).  
155 See Harry H. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal 
Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958) (discussing the presence of 
local investigative efforts aimed at combatting problems inherent in labor manage-
ment collusion, misuse of union funds, and suppression of civil rights by labor lead-
ers). 
156 See Clyde Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
483, 491 (1949) (articulating the intricacies of union priorities, which included both 
active efforts against the employer and rival unions). 
157 See generally Michael J. Goldberg, Present at the Creation: Clyde W. Summers 
and the Field of Union Democracy Law, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 121 (2010). 
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promoting labor power.158  Others were explicit that the search for 
union democracy was a distraction to the core issue of bargaining 
power that the turn to more corporatist operations at the national 
level had quickly revealed.159  Industrial relations scholars outside 
of law schools would continue to be far more sympathetic to more 
European notions of labor corporatism that often saw internal de-
mocracy as antithetical to collective labor union power.160 
The passage of the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts 
showed how, whatever initial opening the NLRA had provided for 
the recognition and expansion of U.S. labor unions, the corporatist 
conception of industrial peace imagined during the New Deal was 
not in sync with the general organization of the U.S. economic or 
political arenas.161  The social movements that sustained labor or-
ganization up until this point fed into a system that demanded 
greater centralization to achieve any economic results through col-
lective bargaining.  This distinct structural weakness left unions re-
cursively less powerless to resist repeated losses at the judicial and 
legislative levels, even as they increasingly turned to electoral poli-
tics without the corporatist underpinnings enjoyed by their Euro-
pean counterparts—most specifically as a distinct labor party.  Re-
telling and reinterpreting what Karl Klare has called the 
“deradicalization” of the NLRA has become a staple among contem-
porary labor law scholars,162 culminating in perhaps the most 
                                               
158 Compare Summers, Legal Limitation, supra note 150 (describing the issue of 
union discipline to be an internal challenge for labor organizations to resolve), with 
Archibald Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 
MICH. L. REV. 819 (1960) (underscoring the importance of federal regulation of un-
ions due to the misbehavior of several union leaders). 
159 See C. Peter Magrath, Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union De-
mocracy, 12 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 503 (1959). 
160 See generally HERBERT S. PARNES, UNION STRIKE VOTES: CURRENT PRACTICE 
AND PROPOSED CONTROLS (1956); JACK BARBASH, AMERICAN UNIONS: STRUCTURE, 
GOVERNMENT, AND POLITICS (1967); DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970). 
161 See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative 
Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 2013 (2009) (reviewing the deficiencies of the NLRB and its inability to re-shape 
U.S. attitudes toward labor organization). 
162 Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of 
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). See also William 
B. Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of “Quasi-Public” Property, 49 
MINN. L. REV. 505 (1965) (describing the difficulty faced by unions to resist public 
antagonism while ensuring employee persuasion); Daniel R. Ernst, LAWYERS 
AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995) 
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restrictive and regulated collective bargaining regime among indus-
trial democracies.163 
Foundationally, while the Wagner Act itself was deemed consti-
tutional, its constitutional justification was achieved incidentally to 
the federal power to regulate interstate commerce rather than 
through a positive articulation of constitutionalized labor rights.164  
At one point, some hope had existed that the success of civil rights 
legislation in penetrating the traditional insulation of economic or-
ganizations from rights-based claims could empower the NLRB to 
articulate a more substantive vision of associative labor rights,165 
but, as Sophia Lee has recently demonstrated, the use of racial dis-
crimination as a constitutional bridge into the workplace failed to 
materialize.166  Some unions themselves openly resisted this devel-
opment by attempting to shield their internal operations from cri-
tiques of racial discrimination,167 and such a choice still stands today 
as one of the greatest lost opportunities for the U.S. labor movement 
to expand on the positive precedents of black labor activism.168 
                                               
(examining the agency of lawyers within the American Anti-Boycott Association, 
which litigated and lobbied against organized labor). 
163 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1527 (2002); Paul C. Weiler, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990) (examining the social and economic changes 
that have led to the deterioration of labor representation within the U.S.); Lance 
Compa, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
ed., 2000) (reviewing the range of U.S. workers seeking to exercise their right to 
freedom of association). 
164 See Barenberg, supra note 86, at 315-16 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to mean that states cannot 
excessively regulate matters of interstate commerce). 
165 See Archibald Cox, Labor Law and the American Constitution, 3 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 5 (1956) (identifying that the NLRB’s acquisition of power to make 
unreviewable rulings exercising or refusing to exercise NLRA jurisdiction limited 
labor’s ability to associate and organize). 
166 Sophia Lee, The Workplace Constitution: From the New Deal to the New Right 
(2014). 
167 See Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union and “Governmen-
tal Action,” 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1960) (discussing union disagreement over incorpora-
tion of diverse racial memberships). 
168 See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 81 (1999) (identifying black labor organization as among the most unified within 
the labor movement of the mid-twentieth century); see, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Sing-
ing “The Right-to-Work Blues”: The Politics of Race in the Campaign for “Voluntary Un-
ionism” in Postwar California in THE RIGHT AND LABOR IN AMERICA: POLITICS, 
IDEOLOGY, AND IMAGINATION 139 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Elizabeth Tandy Shermer 
eds., 2012) (covering the failed attempt to pass a right-to-work proposition in 1958 
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The lack of a distinct constitutional basis for labor organizing 
found in many other countries did not simply enable later legislative 
encroachment, but directly enabled a litany of decisions by the 
courts and the NRLB that hearkened back to the common law treat-
ment of unions during the 19th-century.169  Progressively, the scope 
of legal and political contests over unions was narrowed to focus 
almost exclusively on procedural formalities, the evaluation of 
which is weighed against the implicitly constitutionalized common 
law property rights of owners,170 and with an unrestrained and overt 
hostility to forms of collective action such as secondary strikes,171 sit-
ins,172 and even the right to strike itself.173  The frame of union de-
mocracy led to labor unions becoming the most regulated private 
associations in American society.174 
Today, private unionization in the U.S. exists at an all-time low 
today.175  No gains to better facilitate collective action have ever been 
                                               
because union activists could not gain African Americans support because unions 
engaged in discriminatory practices). 
169 See Patrick Macklem, Property, Status, and Workplace Organizing, 40 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 74 (1990) (arguing that liberal attitudes toward property and status 
continue to limit the transformation of organized labor in western economies); Ken 
Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and “Un-American” Labor Law, 82 N.C.L. 
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sion of the employment-at-will doctrine and the emerging redefinition of labor or-
ganization in the mid-twentieth century). 
170 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994) (examining the Supreme Court decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. 
NLRB, in which the Court held that employers may lawfully prohibit union organ-
izers from soliciting on private property unless the organizers faced “unique obsta-
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eral Labor Law, 47 B.C.L. REV. 891 (2006) (reviewing the NLRB’s current formulation 
of employers’ “right to exclude” union organizers from private property); James 
Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 518 (2004) (underlining the lengthy history of legal decisions supporting 
employers’ rights); Nathan S. Newman, The Legal Foundations for State Laws Granting 
Labor Unions Access to Employer Property, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 689 (2013). 
 171 See Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1363 (1962) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to outlaw secondary 
boycotts because of its effects on third parties who are not involved in the actual 
labor dispute). 
172 See Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and the Limits of 
Liberal Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2010). 
173 See Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Staging an Effective Strike and the Enduring 
Role of the Criminal Law in Modern Labor Relations, 11 WORKINGUSA 23 (2008) (linking 
criminal law’s role in limiting basic labor rights to organize, strike, and provoke 
collective bargaining). 
174 See Fisk, supra note 107 (examining the development of workplace democ-
racy and regulations of labor organization). 
175 See Harry G. Hutchinson, Liberty, Liberalism, and Neutrality: Labor 
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achieved for unions at the federal level, even after multiple eco-
nomic and financial crises.176 
Over time, the response of labor intellectuals to this judicial as-
sault has been to articulate alternative constitutional frames that 
would better support collective labor actions, largely grounded in 
anti-subordination readings of the 13th Amendment177 or more ex-
pansive readings of the associative content of the First Amend-
ment.178  However, such arguments still face the reality that the orig-
inal compromise of the Wagner Act was the result of losses at the 
level of cultural imagination as much as they were legislative.  The 
                                               
Preemption and First Amendment Values, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 779 (2009) (pointing 
to employers and anti-organizing activists’ ability to ground their efforts on First 
Amendment free speech grounds as a crucial factor towards their relative power in 
modern labor relations); Lonnie K. Stevans, The Effect of Endogenous Right-to-Work 
Laws on Business and Economic Conditions in the United States: A Multivariate Approach, 
5 REV. L. & ECON. 595 (2009) (commenting on the effects of “right-to-work” laws 
and their effects on unions’ efficacy). 
176 See Samuel Estreicher, “Come the Revolution”: Employee Involvement in the 
Workers’ State, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87, 87 (1998) (presenting the possibility of 
labor transformations during economic downturn). 
177 See James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitu-
tional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474 (2010) (discussing the rela-
tionship between labor rights claims and the Involuntary Servitude Clause); Jack 
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1459 (2012) (addressing the narrowly tailored use of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and its definition of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude”); Mark Dudzic, 
Saving the Right to Organize: Substituting the Thirteenth Amendment for the Wagner Act, 
14 NEW LAB. F. 59 (2005) (articulating the possibility of using the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to push forward modern labor movements); William E. Forbath, The New Deal 
Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 220-1 (2001) (arguing that Wagner missed an 
opportunity to rest labor rights on the Reconstruction Amendments). 
178 See Kenneth Cloke, Mandatory Political Contributions and Union Democracy, 
4 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court’s restrictions 
for unions to compel contributions from members for political expenditures due to 
first amendment rights); Charlotte Garden, Labor Law Values Are First Amendment 
Values: Why Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2617 (2011) (linking labor speech to the same weight as civil rights speech); 
Charlotte Garden, Citizens United and the First Amendment of Labor Law, 43 STETSON 
L. REV. 571 (2013) (applying the Citizens United decision to labor unions and judicial 
interpretation of unions); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations and Political Opt-
Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012) (labeling the Citizens 
United decision as an asymmetrical decision to existing application of political opt-
out rights for union members); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of 
Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011) (questioning the triumphalism of Citizens 
United as a First Amendment victory and predicting further incoherence on issues 
of campaign financing); Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and 
Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2012) (at-
tempting to reconcile the Citizens United decision with Knox, in which the Court 
continued to limit unions’ ability to levy special assessments for members due to 
First Amendment rights). 
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compromise itself never represented a genuine renegotiation of the 
U.S. social compact.179  Such is the inevitable consequence of James 
Atleson’s classic Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law and 
Catherine Fisk’s critique of Karen Orren’s Belated Feudalism—that 
the Wagner Act did not ward off socialism as much as it failed to 
deracinate the feudal presumptions of the common law regarding 
the basic property/commodity divide in employee-employer rela-
tions.180 
Yet, while some of these larger cultural arguments are recog-
nized by labor scholars, it is most common for reforms to embrace 
the basic proceduralism of labor union certification and advance 
modifications either to union formation181 or to further decentralize 
labor regulation to the state level.182  Some of these calls directly cri-
tique union reactions to changing labor market conditions183 or, es-
pecially those looking to remove the ban on intra-corporate worker 
representation, seek more conciliatory engagement with 
                                               
179 See Stone, supra note 133, at 1580 (emphasizing the need for any new ap-
proach to include a “more accurate description of the industrial world and a more 
viable analysis of the impediments to democracy built into it”). 
180 See James B. Atleson, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
(1983) (expressing misgivings about the political orientation, legislative history, 
and contemporary practice of American labor law); Catherine Fisk, Still “Learning 
Something of Legislation”: The Judiciary in the History of Labor Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQ. 
151 (1994) (examining the fall of collective bargaining from its NLRA roots). 
181 See Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the 
Employee Free Choice Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47 (2009) (labeling the underenforcement of 
employees’ statutory right to bargain as a significant failure of the law governing 
unions); William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, 
and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in 
the United States, 43 U.S.F.L. REV. 291 (2009) (raising alternative factors for unions’ 
decline and explaining that a shift in union participation requires more than just 
reform of existing labor laws). 
 182 See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law: 
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. 
REV 97 (2009) (articulating the positive impacts that increased state influence of la-
bor relations may have); Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in 
Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011) (exploring states and cities’ persistent 
efforts to impact labor relations in their domains); Michael M. Oswalt, The Grand 
Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 
DUKE L.J. 691 (2007) (arguing for grand legislative reform of NLRA); Catherine L. 
Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
857, 858–59 (2014) (examining the conflict between state right-to-work laws and 
federal labor laws). 
183 See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Markets – 
The Kenneth M. Piper Lectureship Series, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 39-42 (1993); Joel Rog-
ers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 124-5 (1993). 
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employers.184  Some take up more abstract arguments about the 
framing of workplace justice arguments,185 but again, almost all 
have the often open assumption that better altering union elections 
will lead to significant progress.  This need to anchor proposals to 
the ideal that unions properly express the U.S. liberal democratic 
tradition remains,186 enabled by the corollary faith that removing 
such roadblocks would allow U.S. workers to achieve the greater 
level of union representation that they desire.187 
Again, most all of these legal proposals are accompanied by a 
critique of current union operations—in particular those that reflect 
and encourage greater corporatist behavior.188  Many scholars still 
trace the decline of union democracy with the progressive shift of 
expenditures from organizing to legislative lobbying189 and a debil-
itating focus on short-term electoral politics.190  Such observations 
                                               
184 See John Pencavel, WORLD BANK, WPS NO. 1469 (1995) (explaining that legal 
frameworks should neither encourage nor discourage unionism but should keep 
unions in a domain where they can be an effective intermediary between employers 
and employees). 
185 See David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 523 (2009) (describing the state of American employment relations to 
be at a “critical juncture” due to a prolonged history of anti-employment); Brishen 
Rogers, “Acting Like a Union”: Protecting Workers’ Free Choice by Promoting Work-
ers’ Collective Action, 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 38 (2010) (highlighting the American 
labor discussion has been rooted upon the normative preference against unioniza-
tion). 
186 Even Samuel Estreicher, a proponent of reforming union elections through 
systemic deregulation and simplification instead of various “procedural niceties,” 
still works normatively within the enterprise level election paradigm.  See Estrei-
cher, supra note 108. But see Goldberg, supra note 108 (articulating that Estreicher 
fails to give enough credit to the current approach towards unions and does not 
factor in sufficient guarantees of democracy and basic civil liberties).  
187 See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 
(2006). 
188 See, e.g., Teresa Sharpe, Union Democracy and Successful Campaigns: The Dy-
namics of Staff Authority and Worker Participation in an Organizing Union, in 
REBUILDING LABOR: ORGANIZING AND ORGANIZERS IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT 62, 
63 (Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004) (arguing that labor revitalization requires 
tactical innovation from union leaders and active participation in actual organizing 
campaigns from rank and file members); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute 
Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11 (2005).  
189 See James B. Atleson, Law and Union Power: Thoughts on the United States and 
Canada, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 463, 488-89 (1994). 
190 See, e.g., Emily J. Charnock, The Rise of Political Action: Labor Unions and the 
Democratic Party (Working Paper, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, 2012) (examining the role of Political Action Committee (P.A.C.) and 
exploring its role in underpinning the labor-Democratic alliance); Paul C. Mishler, 
Trade Unions in the United States and the Crisis in Values, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 861 (2006) (proposing labor reforms to increase efficiency including 
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inform arguments that union democracy and the effectiveness of the 
U.S. labor movement are linked,191 even when such claims call for 
otherwise more radical reforms, such as abandoning striking.192  Of 
great current popularity, labor scholars have attempted to adapt to 
labor contractualism by imagining organizing around individual 
employment rights so that unions can use aggregate litigation as a 
new source of worker solidarity.193  At the local level, there has cer-
tainly been a range of internal union innovations on these grounds, 
but they have only achieved for a short time the hoped for renewed 
democratic energy.194 
Ironically, arguments about union democracy harken back to the 
social unionism of earlier eras, or even in systems abroad.195  It is in 
                                               
reforms to union representation); HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR 
UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA (2001). But see Bob Master, Engaging with Demo-
crats, 19 NEW LAB. FOR. 16 (2010) (describing the limitations of labor’s strategic shift 
toward member based political mobilization). 
191 See, e.g., Matthew J. Parlow, Lessons from the NBA Lockout: Union Democracy, 
Public Support, and the Folly of the National Basketball Players Association, 67 OKLA. L. 
REV. 1 (2014) (looking at the NBA to highlight the critical importance of intra-union 
communications, public relations campaigns, and union democracy when unions 
negotiate); Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy and the Market for Union 
Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367 (1992) (using an efficiency analysis to conclude that 
perfect interest alignment between members and leaders is not always optimal). 
192 See, e.g., STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN LABOR: 
TOWARD A NEW WORKERS’ MOVEMENT (2014). 
193 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2685, 2687 (2008) (explaining that workers and lawyers have increasingly turned to 
employment statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act to secure their substan-
tive employment rights); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: 
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (exploring the 
changing nature of the employment relationship and its implications for labor and 
employment law); Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57, 58 (2002) (identifying that most modern workplace 
protections for employees stem from statutes and common law, not from collective 
bargaining agreements); Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild 
the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1682, 1684 (2014) (analyzing the possibility of 
creating a program that provides representation to workers who are bound to arbi-
trate their legal disputes with their employers). 
194 See Paul M. Secunda, The Wagner Model of Labour Law is Dead, Long Live La-
bour Law!, 38 QUEEN'S L.J. 549 (2013). 
195 See Ian Robinson, Neoliberal Restructuring and U.S. Unions: Toward Social 
Movement Unionism?, 26 CRIT. SOC. 109 (2000) (identifying pathways in which ne-
oliberal policies have promoted shifts toward social movement unionism); Kyle Al-
bert, Labor Union Political Strategy in an Era of Decline and Revitalization, 84 SOC. 
INQUIRY 210 (2014) (analyzing union appearances in congressional hearings and un-
ions’ legislative advocacy activities); Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Move-
ment’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
1927 (2007) (using the Inglewood Wal-Mart case to illustrate unions’ use of legisla-
tive advocacy to achieve their goals); Ann C. Hodges, Avoiding Legal Seduction: 
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calls for social unionism that more biting critiques do emerge re-
garding the Wagner Act regulatory framework,196 but again on the 
level that it inhibits not internal union democracy but the capacities 
of unions to engage in broader forms of social activism;197 especially 
so as to remediate its historical errors of racial or gender exclusion198 
or hostility to immigrant labor.199  Social unionism is seen as provid-
ing the link between unions and the participation of those workers 
outside of the traditional industrial employment.200  And at their 
apex, calls for social unionism expand to the transnational level.201  
                                               
Reinvigorating the Labor Movement to Balance Corporate Power, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 889 
(2011) (reviewing the ways that legal and political action have become central strat-
egies for labor unions). 
196 See Orly Lobel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2146 (2003) (reviewing PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: 
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR MARKET; Catherine Fisk and Xenia Tashlitsky, Im-
agine a World Where Employers Are Required to Bargain with Minority Unions, 27 A.B.A. 
J. Lab. & Emp. L. 1 (2012). 
197 See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237 (2009) (de-
fining a new type of employee - one who focuses more on their public duty than 
their loyalty to corporations). But see Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological 
Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001) (focusing on the internal effects of labor changes when 
assumptions of long term attachment between employer and employee are not pre-
sent). 
198 See Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 211 (2002) (addressing unions’ historical membership and structure 
around blue-collar white males); Charlotte Garden and Nancy Leong, ”So Closely 
Intertwined”: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135 (2013) (present-
ing a nuanced view against the conventional narrative of rivalry between unions 
and people of color). But see Angela Onwuachi-Willis and Mario L. Barnes, The 
Obama Effect: Understanding Emerging Meanings of "Obama" in Anti-Discrimination 
Law, 87 IND. L.J. 325 (2012) (exploring the significance of having a biracial, black-
white president to the enforcement of anti-discrimination law); Harry G. 
Hutchison, Employee Forced Choice? Race in the Mirror of Exclusionary Hierarchy, 15 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 369 (2010) (tracing the disproportionate impact that key labor 
legislation had on African Americans). 
199 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
503 (2007). 
200 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employ-
ment Law for Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251 (2006) (identifying that laws and courts’ interpreta-
tions of employment protections for atypical workers have largely been based on 
workplaces and employment relationships that no longer exist); Lisa J. Bernt, Sup-
pressing the Mischief: New Work, Old Problems, 6 NE. U. L.J. 311 (2014) (assessing legal 
distinctions between employees and independent contractors). 
201 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Making Globalism Work for Employees, 54 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 427 (2010) (reviewing the forms of collective action that have arisen due to glob-
alism). But see James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils and Promises 
of Transnational Labor Solidarity, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 85 (2004) (analyzing shifts in labor 
rights due to increasing globalization); Kolben, supra note 97 (discussing the 
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The focus on union democracy has often left U.S. labor activists 
rediscovering the next new precedent for union revitalization 
among what essentially amounts to tactical victories.202  The broad-
est action taken under the renewed union democracy rubric was the 
split of several unions from the AFL-CIO to form the Change to Win 
Federation in 2005.  However, in just a few years, several of the un-
ions re-affiliated with the AFL-CIO, and what studies have been 
done have shown little success by the remaining Change to Win af-
filiates in new member organizing.203  This only replays the general 
and consistent trend toward union mergers that has characterized 
the U.S. labor movement even prior to the Wagner Act.204  Recent 
case studies of some of the most hopeful, committed and sophisti-
cated local union organizing drives shown them ultimately stymied 
by but one unfavorable aspect of the current regulator regime.205  
The normal dissipation of social capital derived from exceptional 
moments of crisis flows directly into John Godard’s claim that sys-
tems with more decentralized forms of organizing, such as in the 
U.S., are doomed to perpetual cycles of conflict and contention.206  
Yet, the legacy of union democracy is so strong that even dedicated 
activists who seek to shift the view of unions from legal to social 
actors still decry their aspirational corporatism as an impediment to 
their revitalization. 207 
The apotheosis of the individual rights frame underlying the 
core metaphor of union democracy has been the near-complete de-
racination of U.S. union’s financial base through litigation attacking 
                                               
disconnect between existing transnational labor regulation systems within devel-
oping states). 
202 Melvin J. Rivers and Tim Truitt, A Union Representative’s Perspective of De-
clining Union Membership, 3 INT’L J. MANAG. ECON. & SOC. SCI. 125 (2014). 
203 See Tracy Roof, CTW vs. the AFL-CIO: The Potential Impact of the Split on La-
bor’s Political Action, 10 INT’L J. ORG. THEORY & BEHAV. 245 (2007); Rachel Aleks, Es-
timating the Effect of “Change to Win” on Union Organizing, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
584 (2015). 
204 See Jasmine Olivia Kerrissey, Union Mergers in the United States, 1900-
2005 (2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine) (analyzing the 
causes and effects of union mergers in the twentieth century). 
205 The exhaustive case study carried out by Scott Cummings after the dy-
namic Clean Truck Program campaign in L.A. ends with its derailment by federal 
pre-emption after a variety of local strategic and tactical innovations.  Scott L. Cum-
mings, Preemptive Strike: Law in the Campaign for Clean Trucks, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
939 (2014). See also VIRGINIA DOELLGAST, DISINTEGRATING DEMOCRACY AT WORK: 
LABOR UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GOOD JOBS IN THE SERVICE ECONOMY (2012). 
206 John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Movement, 63 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1 (2009). 
207 ARONOWITZ, supra note 192. 
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the ability of unions to require mandatory dues from the shrinking 
number of workers they represent.208  The 2014 decision of Harris v.  
Quinn demonstrated the continuing trend of using free speech 
norms to attack union spending on political lobbying, almost culmi-
nated in 2017 in a complete rejection of agency fees narrowly, and 
potentially only temporarily, avoided in the case of Friedrichs v.  Cal-
ifornia Teachers Association. 
Notably, this trajectory of judicial and legislative deconstruction 
of labor power is not unique to the United States.  In many ways, the 
modern history of labor unions in many common law countries par-
allels the centrality of employer property rights in the feudal origins 
of the common law itself.209  The decline of unions during and after 
Thatcherism in the United Kingdom anticipated much of the consti-
tutional language of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions about the 
illiberalism of corporatist politics.210  The comparatively stronger 
history of corporatist arrangements has led to some pushback out-
side the U.S., even as the frame of individual employee choice has 
led to similar unsuccessful scrambles for organizing strategies 
around employment law.211 
                                               
208 See Sachs, supra note 178 (assessing opt-out rules and their effects on un-
ions); Garden, supra note 178. See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Loch-
nerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015) (examining courts’ growing incorporation of 
Lochner premises into religious liberty doctrine); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years 
of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. (2016) (discussing the revitaliza-
tion of Lochnerism and “liberty of contract” jurisprudence). 
209 See Anthony Honeybone, Introducing Labour Flexibility: The Example of New 
Zealand, 134 INT’L LAB. REV. 493 (1997) (exploring change within the industrial rela-
tions system in New Zealand); Roger Undy, New Labour’s ‘Industrial Relations Set-
tlement’: The Third Way?, 37 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 315 (1999) (discussing the U.K.’s elec-
tion of a Labour government in 1997 and its impact on British industrial relations); 
Sandra Fredman, The Ideology of New Labour Law, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW: 
LIBER AMICORUM BOB HEPPLE QC 9 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2004); Peter War-
ing et al., Comparing Patterns of Re-regulation of Labour in Three Liberal Market Econo-
mies (Paper, 29th Conference of the International Working Party on Labour Market 
Segmentation, 2008). 
210 See Bob Jessop, From Thatcherism to New Labour: New-liberalism, Workfarism 
and Labour-market Regulation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT: 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE (UN)EMPLOYMENT 
QUESTION 137 (Henk Overbeek ed., 2003). 
211 See Trevor Colling, Caught In A Trap? Legal Mobilisation by Trade Unions in 
the United Kingdom (Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations No. 91, 2009) (exploring 
the idea of “legal mobilization” and unions’ role in pressuring employers and gal-
vanizing support amongst members); Mark Bray and Pat Walsh, Different Paths to 
Neo-Liberalism? Comparing Australia and New Zealand 37 INDUS. REL. 358 (1998) (re-
viewing Australia and New Zealand’s shift from compulsory arbitration towards 
neo-liberalism in the twenty-first century); Ingrid Landau and John Howe, Trade 
Union Ambivalence Toward Enforcement of Employment Standards as an Organizing 
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3.3.  Realism in Rebuilding the Corporatist Terrain of U.S.  Labor 
Power 
 
It is important to note that even as the Wagner system is osten-
sibly infused with liberal democratic norms, in fact regional and na-
tional unions in the U.S. have been relatively conservative social ac-
tors when it comes to more aggressive participatory visions of the 
workplace.212  Whatever corporatist power labor unions have 
achieved through electoral politics is similarly restrained by the bar-
gaining dynamics of corporatism more generally.  For example, in 
the 1980s when popular interpretations arose that the Japanese 
workplace was more participatory and successful than those in the 
U.S.,213 hopes were expressed that the next wave of corporate gov-
ernance reforms would move teleologically toward greater em-
ployee voice if not outright ownership.214  Such optimism located a 
new flaw in the Wagner Act regime, the ban on in-house unions and 
other forms of non-union employee representations.215  Yet, union 
leadership aggressively resisted these claims—a resistance partially 
validated by the adoption of such individual rights rhetoric by anti-
union activists in the form of the TEAM Act of 1995.216  
                                               
Strategy, 17 THEOR. INQ. L. 201 (2016) (assessing shifting roles for Australia trade 
unions towards enforcement of minimum employment standards). 
212 See Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the 
Twenty-first Century, U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 696 (1983) (arguing that the U.S. labor move-
ment will need to implement innovative cooperative techniques in place of conven-
tional adversarial tactics in the near future); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key 
Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149 (1993) 
(asserting that voluntary and informal employee caucuses will emerge as a new 
model for protecting employees’ rights). 
213 See Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1736 (1984) (reflecting on social commentators’ 
call for American enterprises to adopt Japanese management techniques following 
the Japanese economic miracle). 
214 Lipton, supra note 33, at 44. 
215 See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Co-
operation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1994) (ex-
amining President Clinton’s establishment of the Commission for the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations and its investigation of whether U.S. labor law re-
quired a major overhaul); Karl G. Nelson, Moving Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Joint 
Management-Employee Committees in the Twenty-First Century, 87 IND. L.J. 119 (2012) 
(reviewing the impact of the Employee Free Choice Act on labor law). 
216 See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening up 
the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1996). 
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Newer scholarship on workplace participation now largely pre-
sumes a tangential relationship between unions and the promotion 
of a participatory workplace, placing their hopes instead on volun-
tary employer self-regulation, popularly known as “new govern-
ance” approaches.217  These approaches present unions as obstacles 
as often as allies,218 and such approaches further individualize work-
place justice by emphasizing employee voice219 or actively portray-
ing worker participation as not a social or dignitary good, but as ef-
ficiency-enhancing.220  
Yet, in the U.S., as elsewhere, arguments extolling the virtues of 
employee voice have not won over employers, who have only fur-
ther sought extensive powers over their workers through increased 
monitoring and demands for demonstrations of workplace loyalty 
in workers’ private and public lives.221  Moreover, arguments about 
employee voice and participation have fed into an entire industry 
devoted to manipulating the psychology of workers to improve 
productivity through creating the illusion of individual empower-
ment.222  All of which further undermines the capacity of individual 
                                               
217 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Govern-
ance in Contemporary Leal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (introducing the “Re-
new Deal,” in which innovative approaches to law is preferred to promote collabo-
rative and dynamic planning); REGULATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE OF GLOBALISATION: 
NEW CHALLENGES, NEW INSTITUTIONS (Brian Bercusson and Cynthia Estlund eds., 
2008) (proposing new labor regulatory schemes that shift power away from na-
tional governmental regulation and towards smaller units of governance). 
218 See John Godard and Carola Frege, Labor Unions, Alternative Forms of Repre-
sentation and the Exercise of Authority Relations in U.S. Workplace, 66 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 1 (2013). 
219 See Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: Four 
Dimensions of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 129 (2001) 
(exploring the multidimensional structure of workplace hierarchy and the possibil-
ities of employee voice in various settings). 
220 See Andrew B. Dawson, Labor Activism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97 
(2015); Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The Case 
for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
871 (2007). 
221 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American 
Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765 (2011) (discussing 
the benefits of granting employees more agency within the workplace setting); Jef-
frey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regu-
lation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091 (2011) (conveying that 
despite holding rights to engage in collective action, workers commonly face barri-
ers to act together against employers). 
222 See, e.g., Jon L. Pierce and Donald G. Gardner, Self-Esteem Within the Work 
and Organizational Context: A Review of the Organization-Based Self-Esteem Literature, 
30 J. MGMT 591 (2004) (reviewing organizations’ active efforts to promote self-es-
teem among the workforce and improve workplace productivity). 
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workplaces to serve as generators of bottom-up social capital for col-
lective action.223 
Unions’ original post-Wagner Act turn to corporatism, and its 
consistent pull since, can thus be read not as a failure of union de-
mocracy but as an inevitable defensive measure in a system with 
irresolvable internal logistical conflicts that amplifies Michels’ insti-
tutional necessities of hierarchy.224  Yet, union leadership in the U.S. 
is thus ultimately left in a double-bind.  Trying to organize individ-
ual workplaces as a starting point for collective action is increasingly 
difficult, and organizing investments have not led to significant re-
turns.  At the same time, when unions attempt to engage in electoral 
politics, the only genuinely corporatist activity they can still simu-
late, they also now receive fewer and fewer returns. 
Such developments have seeded new calls to sidestep union de-
mocracy and facilitate, rather than fight, the centralization of labor 
power, either within the current system225 or through the formation 
of a labor party.226  These minority arguments recall earlier labor 
scholars who saw union growth prior to the Landrum-Griffin Act as 
already fragile.227  Their arguments track both the empirical record 
of union decline following the Landrum-Griffin Act and the fact that 
the one consistent stronghold of unionization in the public sector 
operates on a de facto sectoral basis and has, hereto, been largely 
insulated from the contemporary logic of workplace 
                                               
223 But see Oswalt, supra note 74, (discussing the impact of improvisational un-
ionism in promoting workers’ rights).  
224 A further example is the total failure of more anarchical versions of eco-
nomic democracy to translate into any effective form of social organization follow-
ing the Occupy Movement.  TOM MALLESON, AFTER OCCUPY: ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2014) (discussing alternatives to economic organizational 
schemas like neoliberalism and social democracy in the wake of the Occupy move-
ment’s participatory democratic promise). 
225 See, e.g., Kim Voss, Democratic Dilemmas: Union Democracy and Union Re-
newal, 16 TRANSFER 369 (2010) (arguing that union revitalization is largely due to 
central consolidation, contrary to prevailing scholarly opinion); Dimick, supra note 
44 (arguing for the importance of centralization to achieving union goals). 
226 See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 194 (explaining the insufficiency of the Wag-
ner model of labor law, but does not advocate for a political party, instead noting 
that while a political party would be the “best” path, it is likely impossible in the 
current political environment). 
227 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 158 (pointing to deficiencies among union leader-
ship as a source for weak unionization). See also Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Regu-
lation of Labor Unions, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 299 (1982) (discussing the Labor Re-
form Act of 1959 with respect to the internal affairs of these organizations and 
corrupt practices that sometimes occur). 
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authoritarianism.228  Furthermore, attempts under the current para-
digm to expand union membership to unorganized workers now 
faces the popular perception that unions are themselves weak,229 
and unable to compete with the increasingly rapid regulatory arbi-
trage that employers can engage in, often directly subsidized by lo-
cal and state governments.230  Again, this fosters the calculus by un-
ion leadership that the costs of organizing new populations are less 
cost-effective than defensive legislative expenditures.231 
There is little doubt that many of wholesale pro-union electoral 
reforms popularly argued for under the union democracy would 
improve the state of union membership.  However, the Wagner sys-
tem still requires intensive and constant processes of social organi-
zation and social capital formation to overcome its localized logic no 
matter how extensive union membership might become—almost 
catching up to an economic system whose steady-state operations 
agitate against solidarity and participation. 
These tensions have left U.S. labor scholars and activists on an 
uneasy ground between defensive calls for continued pragmatism 
and more aggressive attempts to imagine more systemic change.232  
Naturally, some calls for reform address social or technological 
changes in the workplace through modulated aspects of the current 
regime.233 For labor activists, it is increasingly attractive for new in-
itiatives that actively side-step the NLRA system in its entirety.234  It 
                                               
228 See, e.g., Cory R. Fine and Paul Baktari, Public Sector Union Democracy: A 
Comparative Analysis, 22 J. LAB. RES. 391 (2001) (arguing that state protections for 
those employees not covered by national labor law—namely public sector employ-
ees—in a majority of U.S. states is insufficient); Joseph E. Slater, Public Sector Labor 
Law in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J 189 (2012) (surveying the state of public em-
ployee labor law and relations in the past decade). 
229 See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 215 (arguing for an expanded labor law sys-
tem that encourages collaboration and organic growth among the workforce). 
230 Chris Brooks, Why Did Nissan Workers Vote No?, LABOR NOTES; DETROIT 1 
(2017). 
231 Leticia M. Saucedo, Everybody in the Tent: Lessons from the Grassroots about 
Labor Organizing, Immigrants, and Temporary Worker Policies, 17 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 
65 (2014) (discussing the obstacles—perceived and actual—to organizing immi-
grant workers). 
232 Secunda, supra note 194. 
233 See, e.g., Jeffrey Hirsch and Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern 
Economy, FORD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the collective bargaining sta-
tus of the Uber Guild (comprised of Uber drivers), as well as other non-traditional 
forms of labor organization whose members are technically not protected by the 
NLRA). 
234 See, e.g., Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Traditional 
Labor Law: A Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232 (2009) (explaining 
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is an open question whether its full collapse would simply accelerate 
the very outcomes for workers which such innovations seek to pre-
vent.235 
While not explicitly rejecting union democracy, the continued 
decline of labor power in U.S. society has led in recent years to calls 
to look more directly at labor as social movement than merely an 
extension of workplace elections.236  The lack of a formal constitu-
tional frame for labor regulation continues to spur new arguments 
based on free speech,237 civil rights,238 or direct constitutionaliza-
tion.239  Furthermore, some labor scholars are becoming more ag-
gressive arguing for the need to add formal elements of centraliza-
tion into collective bargaining.240  These calls have been more 
consistent from industrial relations lawyers outside of law 
schools,241 but not uncommon among comparative labor scholars.242  
The pace of this shift has been accelerating, with established labor 
                                               
how traditional labor laws, such as the NLRA and LMRDA should apply to worker 
centers); Michael C. Duff, ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organ-
ization Bargain, 63 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 837 (2014) (addressing legal problems that 
might arise from ALT-labor coordination). 
235 Id. 
236 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: Structural Approach to 
the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV L. REV. 655 (2010) (addressing whether en-
abling employees to limit managerial intervention in union campaigns is an appro-
priate goal for federal law in the context of the EFCA); Rogers, supra note 185 (stress-
ing that U.S. labor discourse has been predicated on anti-union themes). 
237 Catherine Fisk and Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amend-
ment, 36 BERK. J. EMPLOY. & LAB. L. 277 (2015). 
238 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG AND MOSHE Z. MARVIT, WHY LABOR ORGANIZING 
SHOULD BE A CIVIL RIGHT: REBUILDING A MIDDLE-CLASS DEMOCRACY BY ENHANCING 
WORKER VOICE (2012). 
239 See James A. Gross, Worker Rights as Moral Rights: Wagner Act Values and 
Moral Choices, 4 U. PA. J. LABOR & EMP. L. 479 (2002) (asserting that U.S. domestic 
labor law needs to be re-examined through the lens of international human rights 
principles); Marion Crain and Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor 
Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 561, 564 (2014) (developing a new framework to support 
labor representation within a healthy democracy). 
240 One illustrative shift is the normative move toward centralization in the 
empirical scholarship of Matthew Dimick. Compare Matthew Dimick, Revitalizing 
Union Democracy: Labor Law, Bureaucracy, and Workplace Association, 88 DEN. UNIV. 
L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that the triumph of oligarchy over democracy in U.S. labor 
unions is not inevitable), with Dimick, supra note 44 (proposing ways that unions 
can uproot their organizational strcutures and avoid the pitfalls of decentralized 
bargaining structures). 
241 BRUCE WESTERN, BETWEEN CLASS AND MARKET: POSTWAR UNIONIZATION IN 
THE CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES, 29 (1997) (reviewing differences and advantages of 
centralized and non-centralized labor markets). 
242 Daniel J. Gifford, Labor Policy in Late Twentieth Century Capitalism: New Par-
adoxes for the Democratic State, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 85 (1997). 
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law scholars now making a variety of argument for mandatory sec-
toral bargaining243 and returning their focus to social unionism.244  
Younger scholars are openly positing the question of abandoning 
the Wagner Act model,245 though not without detractors who claim 
that the risks are too high,246 or that their ideas are not necessarily 
new.247  From a comparative and historical perspective, it is not so 
important that such ideas are new or feasible in the near-term, but 
that such a conversation shifts the discourse away from its preoccu-
pation with union democracy as a near or long-term solution. 
What remains clear is that the Wagner system represents a 
flawed system that could only be propped up by attempts to re-cre-
ate genuine corporatist dynamics—which then could only achieve 
any real political clout when sustained by a larger labor movement.  
Hope that the system’s own anti-corporatist design features can lead 
it out of this fundamental conundrum only exacerbates this weak-
ness.  If an existing or newly imagined future labor movement 
should walk away from the Wagner Act, and the aspirational corpo-
ratism it induces, it cannot be simply for some as-of-yet unrealized 








                                               
243 MARK BARENBERG, WIDENING THE SCOPE OF WORKER ORGANIZING: LEGAL 
REFORMS TO FACILITATE MULTI-EMPLOYER ORGANIZING, BARGAINING, AND STRIKING 
(2015). 
244 Gillian Lester, Beyond Collective Bargaining, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR Law 320 
(Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011).  
245 Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism is Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV 
1642 (2016) (considering a labor law regime that can mediate tensions within broad-
level goals to disperse economic and political power through robust secondary as-
sociations). 
246 Matthew Ginsburg, Nothing New Under the Sun: The New Labor Law Must 
Still Grapple with the Traditional Challenges of Firm-Based Organizing and Building Self-
Sustainable Worker Organizations, 126 YALE LAW J. F. 488 (2017). 
247 Marion Crain and Kenneth Matheny, The 'New’ Labor Regime, 126 YALE 
L.J.F. (2017) (linking new calls for worker mobilization across entire sectors with 
pre-NLRA labor goals). 
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4.  THE SUCCESS OF UNION HYPER-CORPORATISM IN BRAZIL 
 
4.1.  A New Unionism and Democratization 
 
Among contemporary labor intellectuals, the international rep-
utation of Brazilian unions has been quite high in recent decades.248  
While aspects of Brazil’s legal system have traditionally been subject 
to critique by some foreign legal scholars on efficiency grounds,249 
the contemporary success of Brazilian unions in playing a central 
role in Brazilian politics has not gone unnoticed by labor scholars 
looking for comparative successes.250  Moreover, in Latin America 
labor scholars have routinely idealized Brazilian unions in their 
search for institutional exemplars,251 especially in countries with 
pro-labor administrations in power.252  In contrast to the decline of 
unions in the U.S., Brazil has presented to the initial observer what 
many consider to be purely aspirational elsewhere—a labor party in 
power for over a decade, broad and mandatory sectoral unioniza-
tion, and little to no constitutional restrictions on collective bargain-
ing.  Economically liberal observers lament the influence of unions 
in Brazil much as social democrats decry the powers of corporations 
in the United States. 
Yet, as recently as 2014, street-sweepers in Rio de Janeiro were 
sanctioned by a Brazilian labor court (Justiça do Trabalho) for carry-
ing out an illegal strike during the peak tourist season of Carnival 
                                               
248 Ladislau Dowbor, Economic Democracy - Meeting Some Management Chal-
lenges: Changing Scenarios in Brazil, 8 PROBS. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. 17 (2013) (pointing 
to the Brazilian approach as a productive way to expand internal consumption and 
open new opportunities for businesses and laborers). 
249 Keith S. Rosenn, Trends in Brazilian Regulation of Business, 13 Law. Am. 169 
(1981). 
250 See Chris Tilly and Marie Kennedy, Latin America’s “Third Left” Meets the 
U.S. Workplace: A Promising Direction for Worker Protection?, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 539, 
552-55 (2014) (identifying successes of Latin American labor organization and as-
sessing their viability for implementation within the U.S. labor system). 
251 See Graciela Bensusán, Organizing Workers in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico: The Authoritarian-Corporatist Legacy and Old Institutional Designs in a New 
Context, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 131 (2016). This idealization often leads to 
some descriptive errors, especially as to the right to strike and the nature of Brazil-
ian internal democracy. 
252 See Maria Lorena Cook and Joseph C. Bazler, Bringing Unions Back In: La-
bour and Left Governments in Latin America (Cornell Univ. ILR School, Working Paper 
No. 3, 2013) (using a labor lens to review the rise of left-party victories in presiden-
tial elections across Latin America in the 2000’s). 
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and they were subsequently dispersed by police using tear gas.  The 
strike was deemed illegal as it was neither initiated nor endorsed by 
the street-sweepers union.253  Six months later, another strike was 
held by subway workers in Sao Pãulo prior to the World Cup, which 
was again declared illegal and dispersed by the police under orders 
from the administration of President Dilma Rousseff—a former 
communist rebel and putative head of the Workers Party (Partido 
dos Trabalhadores, or PT).254  In recent years as Brazil had witnessed 
some of its most active and robust instances of public protest, this 
civil society unrest did not proclaim the PT as the conduit through 
which to voice its discontent, but was rather, in many cases, the ob-
ject of it—leaving unions in a politically ambivalent position.255  This 
ambivalence belies a more complicated relationship between un-
ions, workers and political power than the reputation that Brazilian 
unionism has built up over the past two decades—diagnoses of 
which have begun to emerge in more critical scholarship on Brazil-
ian unions, often informed by U.S. labor scholarship.256 
The origins of this critique are far from purely foreign-in-
spired.257  During the rise of the PT in the 1980s, the labor history of 
Brazil was often presented as tightly linked to failures of union de-
mocracy, wherein corporatist labor unions ignored their rank-in-file 
members and neglected truly agitating for their interests.258  While 
there were moments in the 19th and 20th centuries when Brazilian 
workers organized for political change, such movements were either 
directly repressed by the state or their energy siphoned away by the 
                                               
253 Benjamin Parkin, Rio Trash Workers Stay on Strike Through Carnival, RIO 
TIMES,  (Mar. 24, 2014), http://riotimesonline.com/dev2/brazil-news/rio-poli-
tics/rio-trash-workers-stay-on-strike-through-carnival/ [https://perma.cc/N9L5-
P9AB]. 
254 Transport Chaos in Sao Paulo Following Second Day Running of Metro Strike, 
MERCOPRESS (June 7, 2014), http://en.mercopress.com/2014/06/07/transport-
chaos-in-sao-paulo-following-second-day-running-of-metro-strike 
[https://perma.cc/6W2Y-WCFF].  
255 See, e.g., Luciana Tatagiba and Karin Blikstad, The Left and the June Protests 
in Brazil, MOBILIZING IDEAS (Sept. 4, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://mobilizingideas.word-
press.com/2013/09/04/the-left-and-the-june-protests-in-brazil/ 
[https://perma.cc/K5CT-BQHN] (suggesting that the political articulation of the 
Political Left that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s is fading because it is no longer 
connecting with people of lower classes and the youth). 
256 See infra (Section 4.3).  
257 Alvaro Santos, The Trouble with Identity and Progressive Origins in Defending 
Labour Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 207 (Gráinne 
de Búrca et al. eds., 2014). 
258 MAURICIO BARROS, LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE NEW UNIONISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL (1999). 
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machinations of corrupt and unaccountable union leaders.  Much of 
the early 20th century history of Brazilian labor is told through the 
plight of the Confederação Operária Brasileira (COB), a radical labor 
union which first attempted to form a Brazilian labor party and was 
central to the historic 1917 general strike in Sao Paulo.259  Yet, in the 
following decades a variety of socialist, communist and anarchist-
inspired labor organizations were unable to coalesce into a political 
force sufficient to challenge the rural landowners who had taken 
power after the end of the post-colonial monarchy.260 
The major early 20th century turning point in Brazilian history 
was the military coup that brought the dictatorship of Getulio Var-
gas to power in 1930.  Vargas’s consolidation of power over the next 
decade culminated in his overt adoption of corporatism as a general 
political model for Brazil, known as the New State (Estado Novo). 
In contrast to the lack of genuine corporatism underlying the Wag-
ner Act, Vargas’s corporatist model for labor functioned in the con-
text of his general reshaping of the entire Brazilian state under cor-
poratist logics.261  The labor code that Vargas’s regime adopted in 
1943 (the Consolidaçâo das Leis do Trabalho, or CLT) would serve 
as the foundational labor law of Brazil throughout the 20th century 
and, many would say, today. The brand of nationalism that the Var-
gas dictatorship promoted in Brazil was far removed from the re-
publican ideologies of the U.S., and the CLT system was unapolo-
getically centralized and state-directed.  Overseen by a Ministry of 
Labor, only one union was recognized by the government in each 
industry, in which membership was mandatory and to which all 
workers were required to pay mandatory dues (imposto sindical). 
Following the general corporatist logic of the New State, unions did 
not need to organize workers through elections or bargaining with 
                                               
259 KENNETH ERICKSON, THE BRAZILIAN CORPORATIVE STATE AND WORKING 
CLASS POLITICS (1977). 
260 See JOEL WOLFE, WORKING WOMEN, WORKING MEN (1993) (describing the ac-
tive, if unsettled, labor politics of this early era); Samuel Baily, The Italians and the 
Development of Organized Labor in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, 1880-1914, 
3 J. SOC. HIST. 123 (1969) (providing a comparative study of immigrant influences 
during this era). 
261 See Fernando Silva, The Brazilian and Italian Labor Courts: Comparative Notes, 
55 INT'L REV. SOC. HIST. 381 (2010) (comparing the Brazilian and and Italian labor 
courts while critiquing past discussion of the Labor Court as either a typically na-
tional product or as the transcription of an international model); Melissa Teixeira, 
Law, Race, and Development in the Writings of Oliveira Vianna (Paper, Commerce, 
Corportions and the Law at Princeton University, 2013) (analyzing the works of 
Oliveria Vianna to understand how race shaped corporatists movements in Brazil). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/2
  
2018] The False Hope of Union Democracy 675 
individual enterprise owners. Furthermore, unions were a conduit 
for state benefits rather than a bargaining instrument for private 
welfare. Although not technically members of the government, un-
ion leaders (pelegos) were deeply embedded in the state as a result 
and gained a notorious reputation for corruption. The success of the 
New State in dampening labor unrest was significant, and even al-
lowed the military regime to relax the CLT’s initial ban on striking 
in 1946 without fear of political reprisal. 
Brazilian political history over the following decades was far 
more systemically contested than that of the U.S. post-New Deal, but 
the integration of the corporatist labor system within the general 
logic of the corporatist Brazilian system gave it a durability far 
greater than that of the progressive disintegration of the NLRA 
founded during the same historical era.262 Many local Brazilian labor 
movements still organized and resisted inclusion in the corporatist 
system, but more often than not they ended up settling for trying to 
reform unions from within.  Similar on the surface to U.S. discourse, 
the rallying cry of such reform was union democracy as unions’ pre-
democratic corporatist bargaining not only failed to provide work-
ers with wage increases commensurate with productivity gains,263 
but also failed to transcend urban/rural and racial divides that cleft 
the working classes in Brazil.264  Clearly, under an authoritarian re-
gime, state corporatism was far more effective as a tool of social con-
trol than as a collective force for worker welfare. 
In contrast to narratives popular later in the 20th century, Brazil-
ian labor activists were never quiescent during this time and often 
their efforts were quashed not only by the seductive corruption of 
the corporatist system, but also by direct military violence.265  At the 
same time, even these more militant challenges from outside of the 
system were as susceptible to ignoring union democracy in practice, 
especially when broader working class sympathies were given over 
to the variety of nationalist populism Vargas promoted.266 
                                               
262 See JOHN FRENCH, THE BRAZILIAN WORKERS' ABC (1992) (emphasizing a nar-
rative of opportunism in the success of the corporatist model while deemphasizing 
the issue of union democracy). 
263 Renato Colistete, Productivity, Wages, and Labor Politics in Brazil, 1945–1962, 
67 J. ECON. HIST. 93 (2007) (noting the issues with corporatist bargaining in Brazil).  
264 Sheldon Maram, Labor and the Left in Brazil, 1890-1920: A Movement Aborted, 
57 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 254 (1977) (discussing the failures of pro-democratic corpo-
ratist bargaining regarding class and regional divides).  
265 See ERICKSON, supra note 259. 
266 Id.  
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One of the more telling transnational moments from these mid-
century decades was the failed attempt of government sponsored 
attempts by the AFL-CIO to move Brazilian labor regulation to-
wards the U.S. model, often marketed during the Cold War as “busi-
ness unionism,” in order to “democratize” Brazilian labor unions.267  
Such efforts fared poorly, like most attempts to reshape foreign legal 
systems based on stylizations of U.S. law. Specifically, this attempt  
suffered from misunderstanding the nature of the corporatist Bra-
zilian state.268 
While scholarly revision of this era continues, it is undisputed 
that the corporatist model of unionization remained dominant in 
Brazil up until the 1980s.  However, during this era, the Brazilian 
labor movement began to take on the role common to unions in the 
20th century, that of a key actor in mobilizing for the political democ-
ratization.269  The notion of a “new unionism” emerged, with union 
leaders in southern urban Brazil arguing that they would bring 
about a new era of union democracy with true union accountabil-
ity.270  Central to this movement was the interrelated formation in 
the early 1980s of the PT and the reformist national trade union or-
ganization CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores), bringing to-
gether leftist intellectuals and disaffected members of the labor 
movement.  Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, popularly known as Lula, had 
been the leader of several successful strikes in the 1970s by the pow-
erful ABCD Steelworkers Union in Sao Paulo. He became the figure-
head of both the PT and CUT.271  
                                               
267 See George Bass, Organized Labor and U.S. Foreign Policy: (2012) (Diss., 
Walden University, 2012); Cliff Welch, Labor Internationalism: U.S. Involvement in 
Brazilian Unions, 1945-1965, 30 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 61 (1995); Larissa Correa, AIFLD 
in Brazil Under the Military, in AMERICAN LABOR'S GLOBAL AMBASSADORS 177 (Van 
Goethem et al. eds., 2013); Larrissa Correa, International Solidarity and Foreign Inter-
ventionism, 57 LAB. HIST. 92 (2016).  See, e.g., Martha Riche, The American Institute for 
Free Labor Development, 88 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1049 (1965) (arguing that the United 
States should abandon the practice of law and development, where it exports 
American laws in an effort to catalyze foreign legal development, and instead adopt 
a comparative law model). 
268 Jedidiah Kroncke, Law and Development as Anti-Comparative Law, 45 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 477 (2012) (highlighting the issues of transporting US legal systems 
abroad). 
269 See BARROS, supra note 258; JOHN HUMPHREY, CAPITALIST CONTROL AND 
WORKERS' STRUGGLE IN THE BRAZILIAN AUTO INDUSTRY (1982). 
270 ROBERT ALEXANDER, A HISTORY OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN BRAZIL (2003). 
271 Jose Moises, Current Issues in the Labor Movement in Brazil, 6 LATIN AM. 
PERSP. 51 (1979).  
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CUT specifically championed the idea that it represented an al-
ternative to the corporatist labor regime and criticized the attributes 
of the CLT that left unions more dependent on the state than on 
workers for their legitimacy.  Indeed, the creation of unions outside 
of the corporatist system, which elected their own leaders, was an 
open break with the corporatist politics of the extant military re-
gime.  Much of CUT’s contribution to the democratization move-
ment was its broadening of the inclusiveness of the labor movement, 
incorporating both middle class professionals as well as rural and 
ethnically diverse constituents symbolized by its alliance with the 
Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem 
Terra).  The victories of CUT in the political arena were significant,272 
and it initially succeeded in gaining concessions for workers well 
beyond those of the traditional corporatist unions.273  The effusive 
praise for CUT from international observers was encouraged by ef-
forts of labor intellectuals with the PT, many of whom contributed 
to writing the narrative of union democracy’s ascendance in this era 
of the “new unionism.”274 
 
4.2.  The Iron Rule and Neo-Corporatism 
 
The success of CUT and the PT in pressuring the military regime 
to hold elections for a national Constituent Assembly and paving 
the way for democratic transition is undeniable.  However, the cru-
cial point in evaluating modern Brazilian labor unionism is inter-
preting the process of forming the 1988 Constitution and the PT’s 
subsequent rise to power.  In the course of broadening its social ap-
peal during democratization, CUT had already jettisoned much of 
its more radical ideological elements and embraced the type of social 
unionism of other successful labor parties in Europe and Latin 
America.275  Its emphasis on union democracy, rather than more ex-
tensive forms of social revolution or economic redistribution, 
                                               
272 MARGARET KECK, THE WORKERS' PARTY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BRAZIL 
(1992) 
273 Silva, supra note 261. 
274 Marco Santana, Brazil: The Swinging Pendulum: Between Labor Sociology and 
Labor Movement, 36 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 96, 104 (2009). 
275 See Marco Santana, Entre a Ruptura e a Aontinuidade: Visões da História do 
Movimento Sindical Brasileiro, 14 REV. BRAS. CI. SOC. 1 (1999); Ricardo Antunes & Lau-
rence Hallewell, The World of Work, the Restructuring of Production, and Challenges to 
Trade Unionism and Social Struggles in Brazil, 27 LATIN AM. PERSP. 9, 18 (2000). 
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provided a broader political basis for building a democratic move-
ment. After 1988 it notably retreated from the land redistribution 
called for by its one-time ally, the Landless Workers Movement.276  
CUT’s most immediate impact on the 1988 Constitution was the 
removal of the discretionary powers of union recognition from the 
Ministry of Labor, and thus towards greater union self-regulation—
formal privatization.277  Yet, the basic corporatist structure created 
under Vargas’s New State was not undone.278  With some semantic 
alterations, the main components of the CLT remained unchanged:  
only a single union could be formed within any economic sector, 
membership and dues were mandatory, and there was no new re-
quirement for the direct election of representatives.279  The lack of 
reform within the labor system reflected the highly negotiated na-
ture of the transition to democracy that gave rise to the 1988 Consti-
tution, as was seen in the election of more economically liberal pres-
idents until 2002.280 
As a result, while the authoritarian logic of the Brazilian political 
system was weakened through this transition, in the context of labor 
this privatization simply allowed for the proliferation of unions who 
could make a legal claim (through litigation) to a new category of 
economic activity and then reap the guaranteed rewards of such 
representation.281  Unions still were not charged with bargaining to 
create a system of private welfare, but again engaged with employ-
ers on a sectoral and national basis while serving as conduits for so-
cial welfare benefits granted by the state.282  Yet, the scale and scope 
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of these benefits far outstripped any enjoyed under the old labor re-
gime.  Trade union groups like CUT and others continue to reap the 
reciprocal rewards of this performance, and engage in a range of so-
cial programming and mobilizations both routine and episodic. 
When the PT finally won the national presidency after Lula’s 
third campaign, a new opportunity arose again to revisit these ear-
lier calls for union democracy.  By this point, the power of the PT 
relied heavily on existing unions, and CUT itself benefited from ce-
menting its place within the new corporatist structure.  One of Lula’s 
first moves as President was to form a corporatist consultative body 
drawn from representatives across society, the Council for Eco-
nomic and Social Development (Conselho de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social, or CDES), and to establish a related commission 
on labor reform, the National Labor Forum (Forum Nacional do Tra-
balho, or FNT).  However, the union reforms that emerged from this 
did not, once again, advance union democracy as liberal procedur-
alism beyond requiring older unions to meet the low threshold of 
20% direct worker representation.283  Later in 2008, Lula moved to 
guaranteeing the existing central trade unions 10% of all trade union 
dues.284  In essence, the PT under Lula created a hyper-corporatist 
labor regime with even less internal democracy and more entrench-
ment than before he was in office.  These developments did not sit 
comfortably with some members of CUT and defections have oc-
curred at different moments since 1988, most notably in the for-
mation of Coordenação Nacional de Lutas (Conlutas) in 2004 and 
the later splintering of formally communist and socialist unions.285 
As of yet, very few new or older Brazilian unions have embraced 
union democracy or have developed formal systems for the workers 
they represent to lodge complaints.286  The bargaining that does go 
on between unions and employers, even when highly splintered sec-
tors of the economy, need not involve any of the actual employees 
affected unless striking is called for.287  But, as the recent 
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unauthorized strikes in Rio and Sao Paulo illustrate, unions in Brazil 
have a primarily disciplinary relationship to workers. 
Representatively, Brazil under the PT has continued to refuse 
signing major ILO conventions guaranteeing freedom of associa-
tion.288  When two preeminent contemporary Brazilian labor law 
scholars were asked by a U.S.-based journal to describe restrictions 
on union speech in the workplace, their initial reaction was puzzle-
ment–there are no restrictions, for why would a Brazilian union 
need to speak to the workers in their own workplace?289 
The tangential bureaucratic relationship of many unions to their 
workers also helps explain why so many workers have turned to 
Brazil’s specialized labor courts to resolve their individual employ-
ment problems.  In practice, routine labor disputes have been effec-
tively judicialized290 and expose the gap between the aspirational 
and real conditions of many workers.291  And while Brazilian labor 
courts are often seen as favoring employees over employers,292 they 
have not only grown less protective of union strikes, but act consist-
ently to reinforce incumbent union organization.293 
This lack of reform and CUT’s close ties to the PT have inspired 
calls for recognizing the operation of “neo-corporatism” and open 
laments that the PT has succumbed to Michels’ iron rule.294  This cri-
tique found adherents from the both the left and right, and benefited 
from the growth of critical empirical studies of Brazilian labor un-
ions over the past twenty years.295 Although much of the critique 
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from the right focuses on more traditional arguments about the neg-
ative impact of labor unions in growth and efficiency terms,296 
among some labor scholars the focus has been on the unfulfilled 
promise of union democracy and the effective continued enmesh-
ment of unions with the state rather than direct electoral accounta-
bility to workers.297 
It would elide too much to claim that these critiques are simply 
tied to views that union democracy is a good in itself.  Many cri-
tiques tie a lack of union accountability to concrete issues stemming 
from the natural conservatism of corporatist unions regarding other 
issues of social reform, such as environmental degradation.298  Fur-
thermore, the primarily industrial membership (and thus financial) 
base of unions left employment conditions in many rural areas, es-
pecially outside of the South, neglected even in the post-1988 era.299  
Brazil’s informal sector also has little trade union representation,300 
as well as many other low-wage sectors of employment.301  There are 
still exceptions to these general rules, but exceptions they remain.302 
 
4.3.  The New Reality of Union De-Corporatization 
 
A number of reasonable and often technically measured reform 
proposals emerged from the new critiques of labor neo-corporatism 
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in contemporary Brazil.303  Some of this moderation reflects a kind 
of resignation that the existing political power of corporatist unions 
would be difficult to overcome.  At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that not only have some areas of Brazilian labor regulation 
improved dramatically in recent years, such as labor inspection,304 
but the centralized power of Brazilian unions have also allowed 
them to provide some of the better examples of transnational labor 
action to date. CUT alone participates in fifty transnational partner-
ships as part of its CUTMulti project.305  Brazilian unions have been 
active in bringing lawsuits against foreign employers attempting to 
enforce stricter forms of Taylorist discipline into the Brazilian work-
place,306 with their globally rare successes serving as a noticeable de-
terrent to private equity takeovers.307 
 But perhaps most importantly, since democratization, and in-
tensified during the national reign of the PT, corporatist strikes and 
bargaining have garnered significant above-inflation wage increases 
for workers unprecedented for a country at Brazil’s level of eco-
nomic development.308  Beyond wage-bargaining, the PT has used 
its political clout to successfully expand welfare state protections on 
a number of fronts, including those to make Brazil’s traditionally 
feudal social order more open to minoritized groups.309  In other ar-
eas of Brazilian governance, the rhetoric of participatory citizenship 
has yielded experiments that are now studied worldwide, such as 
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participatory budgeting.310 And, in contrast to the more reactionary 
positions of union movements elsewhere, Brazilian unions have 
been much more supportive of the development of fourth-way 
modes of cooperative management and capital spreading.311  Yet, to 
the extent that Brazilian unions have made Brazilian workplaces less 
subject to employer authoritarianism, they have not done so by di-
rectly empowering workers’ participation in the workplace or 
within their own operation. 
In the wake of these gains, the drive for union democracy must 
again be weighed against the current relative success of Brazilian 
unions in material terms.  What Pedro Ribeiro has called the “am-
phibian” nature of the PT would not be an inherently negative at-
tribute if the alternative was, for example, less labor participation in 
the democratization process.312 Again, one of the common outcomes 
of labor union stimulation of democratization movements is how lit-
tle they gain afterwards and how often they are then politically mar-
ginalized.313  The very process of the CUT’s deradicalization and de-
pluralization followed exactly the track of Michels’ iron law, not 
solely because of raw opportunism but the necessity of effective co-
alition politics.314  Here again, we confront the issue that generating 
social capital to inspire democratization is far different from putting 
in place a steady-state system of union organization that requires 
constant social capital formation derived from the workplace. 
Until very recently, potential reforms of critics of Brazilian union 
hyper-corporatism were theoretical and aspirational. No doubt, the 
great success of the PT in pluralizing Brazil politically and econom-
ically had begun to create expectations far more hopeful than in ear-
lier points in Brazilian history.  Many of the pressures that had beset 
unions globally had also been far less acute, especially as the Brazil-
ian economy is still relatively insulated from the forces of globaliza-
tion and the arbitrage of capital mobility that have made labor 
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organizing difficult elsewhere.  It is notable that beyond critics who 
claim that unions depress Brazilian productivity more generally,315 
some have already claimed that Brazilian unions will suffer the 
same fate once the economy more extensively internationalizes.316 
Moreover, the demographics of Brazil’s workforce are only growing 
more diverse, making the traditional recourse to social unionism 
more challenging.317  And in those areas of the Brazilian economy 
that have already witnessed trade liberalization, unions’ power to 
bargain effectively has been diminished.318 
Thus, as appealing as union democracy may be in theory, and as 
imperfect as Brazilian labor unions are, the paramount question for 
Brazilian labor scholars just a few years ago would be whether di-
minishing their current corporatist privileges solve these problems 
or simply leave workers as helpless as those in the United States to-
day?  Did CUT’s open embrace of the logistical advantages of Mi-
chels’ iron rule avoid a much worse fate for Brazilian labor after 
1988?  If workers have benefited under a hyper-corporatist regime, 
what does this say about the necessary relationship, if any, between 
general and specific economic democracy? 
Unfortunately, these questions are being answered, but in a form 
that no one sympathetic to labor unions in Brazil would desire.  The 
economic and political crises that began to roil Brazil in 2013 culmi-
nated in the empowerment of a new regime under former vice-pres-
ident Michel Temer after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff.319  
Central to Temer’s asserted legitimacy, and reflective of his mem-
bership in the far more centrist Partido da Social Democracia Bra-
sileira (PSDB), was a reform agenda that would supposedly help 
bring Brazil out of recession.  Like many conservative regimes in 
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time of economic crisis, Temer’s constituency cast labor reform as 
key to this reignition.320 
In mid-2017, Temer and his allies were successful in significantly 
rolling back labor protections for Brazilian workers across the board.  
And when it came to unions, the labor reform possessed only one 
key element—removing the system of mandatory union dues under 
a rhetoric of worker choice and freedom.  The enemies of Brazilian 
labor choose to strike exactly at the base of its corporatist power.  
Critiques about the democratic character of Brazilian unions are 
now resoundingly absent from the public discourse, even as work-
ers resist the formal authority of current union leaders. The future 
of the Brazilian labor movement is now far more uncertain than 
those of the halcyon days of hyper-corporatism. 
 
5.  SIMULATING UNION CORPORATISM TO MANAGE LABOR UNREST IN 
CHINA 
 
5.1.  Communist Failures and the Restlessness of Chinese Labor 
 
Like many post-socialist countries, China in the past three dec-
ades has witnessed dramatic shifts in the nature of work during its 
rapid pace of economic reform.  The lingering ideological commit-
ment to worker welfare that adorned its communist-era practices of 
complete state ownership of industry and full-employment has been 
progressively transformed after 1978 through a range of hybridized 
economic actors who used wage labor to structure employment re-
lations.321  The future shape of labor relations in China was initially 
unclear as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sought to promote 
market logics while maintaining its tight grip on a legitimacy pro-
vided by quite a different economic ideology.  The CCP cautiously 
                                               
320 Brazil Senate Passes Controversial Labour Reform, BBC NEWS (July 12, 
2017), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40577868 
[https://perma.cc/G28J-EM9D]. 
321 Daniel Ding et al., The Impact of Economic Reform on the Role of Trade Unions 
in Chinese Enterprises, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 431 (2002). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
686 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3] 
loosened its traditional opposition to private property in land and 
industry,322 but fully embraced the commodification of labor.323 
In fact, while many contemporary observers in and outside of 
China are rightly critical of the CCP’s current treatment of labor, in 
the 1980s there was a great deal more excitement about the possible 
outcomes of the reforms for workers.  One object of this interest was 
Township Village Enterprises (TVEs), where partial privatization re-
sulted in communal ownership and regulation of local industry.324  
As Teemu Ruskola has shown, the productivity of TVEs often 
eclipsed that of much larger State Owned Enterprises (SOEs),325 but 
they were abandoned by the CCP for reasons unrelated to worker 
welfare.326 
Nonetheless, creating a new labor law regime to manage its mas-
sive mixed state-private economy became one of the many facets of 
the CCP’s rapid legalization strategy.327  The CCP’s massive buildup 
of legal infrastructure and personnel beginning in the 1980s has 
sought to use law as an intermediary logic for strengthening regula-
tory capacity while shoring up the regime’s domestic and interna-
tional legitimacy.328  In recent decades, the varieties of Chinese 
workplaces has proliferated,329 and designing legal rules to govern 
this diversity has presented one of the great challenges of the CCP’s 
project of legal reconstitution. 
At the outset of the 1978 reforms, the CCP had a pre-existing 
state union, known as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) (Zhonghua Quanguo Zonggong Hui).  Formally, the 
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ACFTU predates the CCP, having its historical roots in labor organ-
izations of the 1920s during the rule of Chiang Kaishek’s authoritar-
ian regime.330  When the CCP rose to power in 1949, it folded the 
ACFTU into its new regime—promising worker empowerment after 
decades of repression by Chiang’s administration.  However, many 
labor leaders objected to the vision of a single state union advanced 
by the CCP, wherein the independence of unions was unnecessary 
given the traditional communist assertion that state and worker in-
terests were perfectly aligned.  As a result, after 1949 many original 
ACFTU leaders were purged and suffered various forms of retalia-
tion.331  In contrast to the corporatist social theories that influenced 
the U.S. and Brazilian labor regimes of the early 20th century, the 
ACFTU was clearly seen as solely an instrument for transmitting la-
bor policy without a need to balance worker interests with that of 
other social groups, as the state union neither needed to bargain on 
behalf of workers nor represent their distinct interests. 
After 1978, the role of the ACFTU—which had been temporarily 
disbanded during the Cultural Revolution—was less clear as the 
CCP shifted away from complete state ownership and its member-
ship levels fell.  The TVE experiment and the widespread persis-
tence of SOEs showed that the CCP lacked a coherent vision of how 
it wanted labor markets to operate, and it was not until the early 
1990s that there was any significant legislation passed related to fu-
ture intentions for the ACTFU. 
In 1992, a new Trade Union Law communicated that the CCP 
wanted the ACTFU to play an expanded role in labor markets, but 
still as a unitary actor from within the state.332  As such, the ACTFU 
operates like many state agencies, with a vertical legal relationship 
to a relevant Ministry, here the Ministry of Labor, and a horizontal 
political relationship with parallel party organs.333  Critically, chief 
ACTFU personnel continue to be CCP members and its leadership 
holds positions in these same parallel party organs.334 
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The CCP’s legal re-institutionalization of the ACTFU, reinforced 
again through amendments to the revised Trade Union Law in 2001, 
reflected a need to respond to growing labor unrest following eco-
nomic liberalization.  The dislocations of new insecure employment 
patterns and the fallout from intense industrialization and urbani-
zation left many workers facing harsh working conditions with little 
to no legal or political recourse.335  Labor protest grew in tandem 
with the speed of Chinese economic growth, stimulating labor un-
rest that elicited sharply divided responses in Chinese intellectual 
and policy debates regarding labor law and the ACFTU.336  The 
scope of this unrest only continues to intensify, and is today consid-
ered one of the major systemic challenges to CCP rule.337 
Recently, this unrest has come to greater global attention with 
strikes and other forms of collective protest highlighting abuses at 
Foxconn, one of the largest private manufacturers in the world and 
supplier to well-known U.S. consumer electronics firms such as Ap-
ple and Microsoft.338  In such cases, the priorities and aims of the 
ACFTU demonstrate what Feng Chen has called its “double institu-
tional identity”:  both disciplinary agent of the state and putative 
representative of workers’ interests.339 
 
5.2.  Elections as Authoritarian Innovation 
 
Defining China’s economic or political regime after 1978 has 
claimed the energy of many scholars, all of whom try to reconcile 
the CCP’s simultaneous monopoly on political power with the 
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Perspective, 48 EURASIAN GEO. & ECON. 413 (2007).  For the recent intensifications, 
CHINA ON STRIKE (Zhongjin Li et al. eds, 2016). 
338 Hilary Josephs, Productions Chains and Workplace Law Violations, 3 GLOBAL 
BUS. L. REV. 211, 216 (2013). 
339 Feng Chen, Between the State and Labour, 176 CHINA Q. 1006, 1007-8 (2003). 
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dizzying complexity of Chinese social and economic develop-
ment.340  Corporatism has had its share of proponents in this effort, 
as well as it critics.  Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger influentially 
argued during the mid-1990s that China was corporatist because the 
CCP designated group representatives for collective interests who 
were allowed to bargain with or become included in the state.341  
They also claimed that China was undergoing a transition from state 
to societal corporatism, as defined earlier by Schmitter—a claim they 
have recently retracted.342 
Critics of the corporatist label do not deny the aspiration of the 
CCP to use corporatist-like policies to manage its close relation with 
private businesses and new social actors.  They do argue that such 
policies do not capture the diversity of relations that escape direct 
corporatist inclusion,343 especially following the often highly decen-
tralized nature of legal and political administration.344  In the eco-
nomic realm, Holbig has called this “fragmented corporatism”345 
and "Bruce Dickson has described the relationship of private sector 
elites and the party as one of coopted inclusion rather than true ne-
gotiation.346  The corporatist frame continues to be popular as way 
of describing local state-business relationship as well.347 
What remains evident is that whatever complexities exist within 
Chinese society, the CCP has pursued a strategy of simulating cor-
poratist structures as it constructs what many consider the most 
                                               
340 The corporatist term has a longer history in Chinese studies, especially in 
describing guild and family based businesses of the pre-CCP era and in the Chinese 
diaspora.  Daniel Fitzpatrick, Chinese Family Firms in Indonesia and the Question of 
‘Confucian Corporatism,’ in LAW AND THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 150 (Hooker 
ed., 2002). 
341 Jonathan Unger & Anita Chan, China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model, 
33 AUSTRALIAN J. CHINESE AFF. 29, 38 (1995). 
342 Jonathan Unger & Anita Chan, State Corporatism and Business Associations 
in China, 10 INT’L J. EMERGING MKTS. 12 (2015). 
343 Ray Yep, The Limitations of Corporatism for Understanding Reforming China, 9 
J. CONT. CHINA 547, 548 (2000). 
344 ZHENG YONGNIAN, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA (2007). Contra Thomas 
Foley, A Devolution Revolution?, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 951 (2007). 
345 HEIKE HOLBIG, FRAGMENTED CORPORATISM INTEREST POLITICS IN CHINA’S 
PRIVATE BUSINESS SECTOR (Paper, ECPR Joint Sessions, 2006).  
346 Bruce Dickson, Cooptation and Corporatism in China, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 517 
(2000) and JIE CHENG & BRUCE DICKSON, ALLIES OF THE STATE (Harvard University 
Press, 2010). 
347 Jean Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism 
in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99 (1992) and Melanie Manion, Authoritarian Parochialism, 
218 CHINA Q. 311 (2014). 
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durable instance of modern bureaucratic authoritarianism.348  The 
recent CCP slogan of promoting a “harmonious society” directly 
echoes the corporatist sentiments of Vargas and other early 20th cen-
tury authoritarians.349  While disconnected from the intellectual cur-
rents that influenced the U.S. and Brazilian union models, the CCP 
is a partial inheritor to the type of group based democratic theories 
that inspired the nomenclature of the “democratic republic” of var-
ious communist regimes.  The messiness of attempts to categorize 
Chinese governance as “corporatist” stems from the fact that, in con-
trast to a formally corporatist system, this is no overarching institu-
tionalization that defines legal bargaining units, their powers, or fa-
cilitates their bargaining.  The struggle to reconcile centralized CCP 
political power with the sheer transactional volume of modern Chi-
nese society has produced any number of ongoing experiments by a 
variety of often-opposed intra-CCP stakeholders.  Instead, the CCP 
is introducing corporatist dynamics to simulate the social and polit-
ical effects of corporatist they desire, without formally devolving 
any legally independent power to designated bargainers.  Thus, the 
emergent dynamics of interest group bargaining are best character-
ized as “simulated corporatism.” 
Emerging CCP policy regarding the ACFTU reveals that it sees 
labor as one issue where experiments with simulating corporatism 
will be most pronounced as collective wage-bargaining can serve 
both as an indirect instrument of state policy and, most critically, as 
a manager of labor unrest.350  In drawing comparisons between his-
torical U.S. and contemporary Chinese labor relations, Cynthia 
Estlund concludes that the CCP hopes these reforms can achieve 
                                               
348 Baogang He, China’s Responses to the Arab Uprisings, in DEMOCRACY AND 
REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA: SOCIAL PROTEST AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 161 (Saikal & Amitav eds., 2014). The other call China’s re-
action the Arab Spring an “ingenious neo-Foucauldian approach to policing, mon-
itoring and controlling society.” 
 349 LI HUAN (李环主编), HEXIE SHEHUI YU ZHONGGUO LAODONG GUANXI (和
谐社会与中国劳动关系) [The Harmonious Society and China’s Labor Relations] 
(2007). See LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC 
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (Stanford University Press, 1990). 
 350 Mingwei Liu, Union Organizing in China, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 30 
(2011); Chris Chan & Elaine Hui, The Dynamics and Dilemma of Workplace Trade Union 
Reform in China, 54 J. INDUS. REL. (2012) and Xian Huang, Collective Wage Bargaining 
and State-Corporatism in Contemporary China, in THE CHINESE CORPORATIST STATE 50 
(Jennifer Hsu & Reza Hasmath eds., 2013). 
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exactly the promise of “labor peace” that Roosevelt sought to quell 
more radical reforms with the NLRA.351 
It is often forgotten today that the formation of a private labor 
organization in the late 1980s, the Workers Autonomous Federation, 
was the primary motivation for the CCP’s violent repression of the 
Tiananmen Protests in 1989.352  This fear of labor protest reflects the 
CCP leadership’s long-standing recognition of labor solidarity’s role 
in other democratization movements.353  The CCP has similarly 
moved to actively undermine the independent labor unions of Hong 
Kong after the British turnover, who remain a foundation of political 
resistance to the Mainland.354  
In this vein, the CCP has promoted new organizing drives by the 
ACFTU and made total workplace representation an open policy 
goal, including foreign owned enterprises.355  In these drives, the 
CCP has remained relatively agnostic as to the specific organiza-
tional forms and tactics of unions, allowing both industrial and en-
terprise, or grassroots, unions to be formed, as well as other unions 
based on a variety of demographic and geographic frames.  These 
flexible organizing rubrics also reflect the incentives provided by the 
mandatory fees paid by members to these often overlapping un-
ions.356 
While far from legally mandatory, the CCP has encouraged 
broad ACFTU-sanctioned collective bargaining at the sectoral level 
as a form of de facto administrative negotiation in order to secure 
workplace concessions and depress private labor mobilization.357  
                                               
351 CYNTHIA ESTLUND, A NEW LABOR LAW FOR CHINA’S WORKERS (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2017). 
352 Kai Chang (常凯), Gongchaowenti de Diaocha yu Fenxi (工潮问题的调查与分
析) [A Survey and Analysis of the Strikes], 1 DANGDAI GONGHUI (当代工会文丛) 
[Contemporary Trade Unions] 1 (1988) and Andrew Walder & Gong Xiaoxia, Work-
ers in the Tiananmen Protests, 29 AUSTRALIAN J. CHINESE AFF. 1 (1993). 
353 Masaharu Hishida, Introduction, in CHINA’S TRADE UNIONS xvi (Masaharu 
Hishida et al. eds., 2010). 
354 Robert Berring, Farewell to All That, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 
446 (1997) and Andy Chan, Trade Unions in Hong Kong: Worker Representation or Po-
litical Agent?, in TRADE UNIONS IN ASIA 81, (John Benson & Jing Zhu eds., 2008). 
 355 Tomoaki Ishii, Trade Unions and Corporatism Under the Socialist Market Econ-
omy in China, in CHINA’S TRADE UNIONS 1, 12 (Masaharu Hishida et al. eds., 2010) 
and Zana Bugaighis, What Impact Will the Revised Trade Union Law of China Have on 
Foreign Business?, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 405 (2007). 
356 Wu Qingjun, Corporate Governance and Trade Unions in Foreign Compa-
nies in China (Paper, Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Innovation 
& Management, 2014). 
357 Eli Friedman, Economic Development and Sectoral Unions in China, 67 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 481 (2014). 
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The new collective agreements are contracts in name only, as they 
are more accurately understood as political settlements containing 
broad employment contract minimums of the industrial or geo-
graphic area implicated.358  At the highest level, the Ministry of Hu-
man Resource and Social Security represents national government 
interests and the Chinese Enterprise Directors’ Association those of 
employers.359  These negotiations rarely contain robust private wel-
fare provisions, but can provide supplements to the basic level of 
welfare state benefits available from national and local govern-
ment.360  Yet, these bargains have yet to be robustly enforced, and it 
is important to remember that the CCP primarily views them as ad-
ministrative labor coordination devices.361  Notably, during the 
Global Financial Crisis such agreements were no bar to the quick 
renegotiation of wage freezes and rollbacks.362  Some observers have 
expressed optimism that such consultative arrangements will lead 
                                               
358 For example, in 2014 a joint agreement among a variety of unions and busi-
ness associations formed a “Food and Beverage” collective wage agreement that 
formally covered 22 million workers and detailed wage minimums, benefits and 
job training programs.  Eli Friedman, Experimentation and Decentralization in China 
Labor Relations, 68 HUMAN REL. 181 (2015). 
359 CEDA describes itself as a “bridge and link” to government. CHINA 
ENTERPRISE CONFEDERATION/CHINA ENTERPRISE DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION, www.cec-
ceda.org.cn/english [https://perma.cc/X4JM-D93L] 
360 A Complete Guide to China’s Minimum Wage Levels by Province, City, and Dis-
trict, CHINA BRIEFING (Jan. 28, 2013), available at http://www.china-brief-
ing.com/news/2013/01/28/a-complete-guide-to-chinas-minimum-wage-levels-
by-province-city-and-district.html [https://perma.cc/7JF5-JMVA]; Mark Frazier, 
After Pension Reform, 39 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 45 (2004); Robert Guthrie & Mari-
yam Zulfa, Occupational Accident Insurance for All Workers: The New Challenges for 
China, 3 E. ASIA L. REV. 1 (2008); China Labour Bulletin, Beijing to Increase Municipal 
Minimum Wage, Pensions and Welfare Benefits (Dec. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.clb.org.hk/content/beijing-increase-municipal-minimum-wage-
pensions-and-welfare-benefits [https://perma.cc/PBU9-FQTZ]. 
361 TIM PRINGLE, TRADE UNIONS IN CHINA (Routledge, 2011). Also see Xin He, 
Administrative Law as a Mechanism for Political Control in Contemporary China, in 
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 143 (Stephanie Balme & Michael Dowdle 
eds., 2010). 
362 Sarah Biddulph, Responding to Industrial Unrest in China: Prospects for 
Strengthening the Role of Collective Bargaining, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 35 (2012). 
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to meaningful gains for workers,363 but as an empirical question this 
is still quite open-ended.364 
Moreover, new ACFTU expansion has not changed the basic fact 
that Chinese workers enjoy no right to strike or anti-retaliation pro-
tections.  Like Brazil, the CCP has never signed ILO treaties ac-
knowledging a private right of labor association.365  Strikes are not 
per se illegal, but without these protections workers assume huge 
risks to engage in collective action of any form.  Employers and local 
governments often ally with the ACTFU to actively suppress pri-
vately organized strikes.366  
While the CCP fear of labor solidarity attracts national attention 
to collective labor actions,367 even when administrative bargaining 
results in employer concessions this is fundamentally a self-inter-
ested longitudinal calculation by the government actors involved.368  
The essentially non-legal characteristic of these bargains is core to 
the nature of simulated corporatism.  Their negotiated status also in 
part explains why the once lauded symbol of the ACFTU’s organiz-
ing at Walmart stores was met with little final resistance by perhaps 
the most well known anti-union corporation in the United States.369  
Similarly, the facilitative function of the ACFTU was also well 
                                               
363 Tim Pringle, Labour as an Agent of Change, in POLARISING DEVELOPMENT 192 
(Lucia Pradella & Thomas Marois, eds., 2015) and Fuxi Wang & Mingwei Liu, Col-
lective Consultation in China, in A LABOUR PROCESS PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA 233 (Mingwei Liu & Chris 
Smith eds., 2016). 
364 Xian Huang, Collective Wage Bargaining and State-Corporatism in Contempo-
rary China, in THE CHINESE CORPORATIST STATE 50 (Jennifer Hsu & Reza Hasmath 
eds., 2013). 
 365 Pitman Potter, China and the International Legal System: Challenges of Partic-
ipation, 191 CHINA Q. 699 (2007). The participation of the ACFTU in the ILO has 
remained a point of contention within and without the organization. 
 366 Yang Su & Xin He, Street as Courtroom, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 157, 162 (2010) 
and Chen Feng, Trade Unions and the Quadripartite Interactions in Strike Settlement in 
China, 201 CHINA Q. 104, 108 (2010). 
367 Jidong Chen, Jennifer Pan & Yiqing Xu, Sources of Authoritarian Respon-
siveness: A Field Experiment in China. (MIT Political Science Department Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 11, 2014). 
368 Feng Chen, Legal Mobilization by Trade Unions, 52 CHINA J. 27, 44 (2004) and 
Feng Chen, Union Power in China, 35 MOD. CHINA 662 (2009). 
369 The meaning of Walmart’s unionization is still a key symbol in evaluations 
of the future ACFTU activism. Baogang He & Yuhua Xie, Wal-Mart’s Trade Union in 
China, 32 ECON. & INDUS. DEMO. 1 (2011); Anita Chan, The Fallacy of Chinese Excep-
tionalism, in CHINESE WORKERS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 11-12, 12 (Anita Chan 
ed., 2015) and Chunyun Lu & Mingwei Liu, A Pathway to a Vital Labour Movement 
in China, in CHINA AT WORK 278 (Mingwei Liu & Chris Smith eds., 2016). 
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demonstrated in the Foxconn agreement to allow union representa-
tives to help guide self-monitoring proposals.370 
 
5.3.  Union Democracy as a Siphon of Solidarity 
 
Labor scholars in, and especially outside, of China have begun 
to argue that the nascent corporatist character of the ACFTU should 
be infused with representative mechanisms or replaced with a re-
gime of independent democratic organizing.371  Some observers 
were and still are optimistic that the expansion of the ACFTU can 
pave the way for its re-orientation as a more representative institu-
tion,372 while others remain doubtful that it can ever unmoor itself 
from its state dependence.373  It is certainly an open question as to 
whether the CCP’s will be able to sufficiently simulate corporatist 
dynamics to quell labor unrest and ward off destabilization of its 
regime.  Thus, while the CCP clearly has a corporatist future in mind 
for the ACTFU, the basic fact remains that its ability to manage local 
social and political actors is one of its core governance dilemmas. 
Hope emerges from the fact that local chapters of the ACFTU 
have been empowered by recent organizing campaigns, greatly bol-
stered from increased dues payments.  New spaces for innovation 
have opened up at the local level.374  Grassroots unions in provincial 
industrial hubs such as Zhejiang and Guangdong have been the sites 
of experimentation with direct cadre elections, including in foreign 
companies.375  Such elections would constitute a significant inter-
vention in local unions, as generally enterprise union leaders are 
                                               
370 Ying Zhu et al., Employment Relations ‘With Chinese Characteristics,’ 150 INT’L 
LAB. REV. 127 (2011); Tony Fang, Ying Ge & Youqing Fan, The Cooperative Roles of 
Chinese Unions in Multinational Corporations (unpublished paper, 2003) and Jef-
frey Huvelle & Cecily Baskir, A Fair Labor Future for Foxconn? The 2012 FLA Audit of 
Apple's Largest Chinese Supplier, 1 PEKING U. TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 212 (2013). 
371 Toby Merchant, Recognizing ILO Rights to Organize and Bargain Collectively, 
36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 223 (2004) and Mayoung Nham, Note, The Right to Strike 
or the Freedom to Strike, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 919 (2007). 
372 Bill Taylor, Trade Unions and Social Capital in Transitional Communist States, 
33 POL’Y SCI. 341 (2000).  
373 Mingwei Liu, Union Organizing in China, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 30 
(2010). 
374 Youqing Fan & Peter Gahan, What Are Chinese Unions Doing?: Explaining 
Innovation and  Change in Grassroots Unions (available at: pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2113221). 
375 Anita Chan, Trade Union Elections in Foreign-Owned Chinese Factories, 13 
CHINA: INT’L J. (2015). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/2
  
2018] The False Hope of Union Democracy 695 
members of the local business community who are either appointed 
or who run unopposed.376  More controversially, provincial-level 
unions have introduced potential reforms to protect limited 
strikes.377  The reinvigoration of the worker congress system as a 
form of in-house consultation popular in the era of greater state-
ownership has also garnered attention as a potential new focal point 
for more representative dynamics within Chinese companies.378 
Yet, as much as the CCP has frequently allowed experimentation 
in local governance, even plainly illegal improvisations,379 it has 
from the outset closely monitored local unions for any sign of hori-
zontal worker solidarity.380 While it is likely that discrete experi-
ments in intra-union democracy may be allowed to the extent that it 
increases internal ACFTU effectiveness and external legitimacy, it is 
equally unlikely to foster logics of representation related to collec-
tive action.381 So as experiments with internal elections continue, the 
proposals for a protected right to strike in Guangdong was with-
drawn, even when labor unrest remained relatively unabated.382 The 
takeaway here is that focusing the energies of aggrieved workers 
anywhere but collective action is a worthy experiment to an author-
itarian looking to sap the energies of the labor market. 
It is important to remember that one of the CCP’s core political 
strategies has been to portray its intentions in populist terms and 
leave the administration of unpopular practices to local 
                                               
376 Jude Howell, All-China Federation of Trades Unions Beyond Reform? The Slow 
March of Direct Elections, 196 CHINA Q. 845, 863 (2008).and Anita Chan, Challenges 
and Possibilities for Democratic Grassroots Union Elections in China, 34 LAB. STUD. J. 293 
(2009). 
377 Guangdong Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises [Guan-
dong Sheng Qie Minzhu Guanli Tiaoli Cao’an Xiugai]; Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Hexie 
Laodong Guanxi Cujin Tiaoli [Regulations to Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on 
the Promotion of Harmonious Labor Relations]). 
378 Cynthia Estlund, Will Workers Have a Voice in China’s “Socialist Market Econ-
omy”? 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.  89, 96n27 (2015). 
379 Eva Pils, Waste No Land: Property, Dignity and Growth in Urbanizing China, 
11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 41 (2010) (describing illegal “sales” of land between 
peasants and villagers).  
380 Chang Kai (常凯), Laoquan Lun (劳权论: 当代中国劳动关系德法律调整) 
[Theory of Worker’s Rights], 26 (2004). 
381 Youqing Fan, Worker Participation and Union Revitalization: A Comparison of 
“Bottom-Up” and “Top-Down” Workplace Unions in RetailCo (available at: pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128003). 
382 Aaron Halegua, Strike a Balance, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 26, 2015, 
at A15. 
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governments.383 In the context of labor, this had led to what Eli 
Friedman called the “insurgency trap,” whereby national political 
and legal organs like the Ministry of Labor claim to be responsive to 
labor unrest, produce national legislation and intervene when labor 
protests grow intense.  Yet, subsequent day-to-day administration is 
still left to local governments where intimate relations among un-
ions and local business are most intense and the enforcement of legal 
rights is costly.384 Friedman’s thesis is supported by the continued 
exertion of authority over the ACFTU by the Ministry of Labor,385 
and the structural fact that the career trajectories of ACFTU mem-
bers are still determined by promotion policies dictated by the Min-
istry.386 Thus, even reforms that appear analogous to representative 
dynamics in other systems are in practice, more akin to the type of 
internal party discipline with which many modern authoritarians 
use to improve their administrative capacity.387 Some of these exper-
iments do open space for bottom-up forms of worker representa-
tion,388 but the CCP has no particular aversion to improved worker 
welfare—just the means by which it can be achieved while main-
taining their political power.389 More critically, for all of the 
ACFTU’s recent organizing activity, few studies have shown an ac-
tual wage premium associated with new union representation that 
would reflect any genuine bargaining power and potentially gener-
ate worker loyalty to these institutions.390 
                                               
383 Diana Fu, Fragmented Control Governing Contentious Labor Organizations in 
China, 30 Governance 445 (2017). 
384 Eli Friedman, The Insurgency Trap (Cornell University Press, 2014).  
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Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 708, 2005).  
386 Chelsea Chia-chen Chou, The Expansion of Social Rights in Authoritarian Re-
gimes: The Politics of Labor Policy Reform in China, 1978–2009 (Diss., Cornell Univer-
sity, 2009).  
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done so in the past, but exhibited little interest in actually bringing workers into 
their consultative processes with employer groups. Katie Quan, One Step Forward, 
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389 A Labour Process Perspective on the Transformation of Work and Employ-
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390 Chang Lee & Mingwei Liu, Collective Bargaining in Transition, in The Role of 
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In a similar fashion, the CCP has been mixing its new top-down ad-
ministrative bargaining strategy alongside the ACFTU with legisla-
tion aimed at remediating labor unrest through re-emphasizing em-
ployment rights based on individual labor contracts.391 This dual-
strategy reflects the larger CCP pattern of governance through sim-
ultaneous individuation and state-dependence, with a bias for 
mechanisms that are effective for high-skilled workers, and espe-
cially those with the resources to enforce them.392 Chinese workers 
have been undoubtedly eager to litigate based on their new rights,393 
and while enforcement of employment rights has been traditionally 
very uneven,394 at least one recent study argues for an empirical link 
below employment law reforms and the positive economic out-
comes for some workers.395 The CCP has allowed foreign labor 
NGOs to operate in the employment law realm, signaling that it sees 
employment law as a more open site for experimentation than labor 
organizing,396 much like its formal embrace of corporate social re-
sponsibility campaigns.397 When employment law innovations do 
occur at the local level, the CCP has been eager to embed those 
deemed successful into its formal administrative structure.398 
                                               
Relations, 21 China Econ. Rev., 202 (2010) (finding that union participation had a 
moderate positive effect on labor productivity, contrary to the conclusions of the 
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Before hopeful parallels are drawn to arguments made by U.S. 
labor scholars regarding the social unionism potential of employ-
ment rights-based organizing, it should be noted that the CCP has 
universally prohibited class action procedures,399 and that such 
rights are often not available to China’s substantial migrant and in-
formal labor sectors.400 Employers have also themselves been quick 
to innovate to avoid new employment law protections, including the 
use of labor sub-contracting and other forms of non-standard work-
ers.401 SOEs and unionized workplaces often exhibit higher than av-
erage use of contingent workers.402 Alongside the same genre of au-
thoritarian workplace monitoring regimes increasingly found in 
U.S. workplaces,403 Chinese workers face increasingly irregular, or 
precarious, work patterns.  These practical delimitations again help 
explain why even foreign companies have provided little pushback 
against new employment rights legislation.404 
In sum, the CCP has to date prevented any legal processes of 
interest aggregation from occurring around labor.405 Again, whether 
it will continue to do so successfully is unresolved.  In recent years, 
the CCP has begun to exhibit a loss of faith in its capacity to use legal 
regulation as an effective force to combat social unrest, and the 
costly surge of labor cases into the court system has been one signif-
icant factor in the CCP’s redeployment of more traditional authori-
tarian forms of repression.406 As strong as the CCP incentives have 
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U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 595 (2009).  
400 From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization (Sarosh Kuruvilla et al eds., 2011) and 
Lu Zhang, From Detroit to Shanghai?: Globalization, Market Reform, and Dynamics of 
Labor Unrest in the Chinese Automobile Industry (Indiana University Research Center 
for Chinese Politics & Business Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3, 2010). 
401 Pun Ngai & Lu Huilin, A Culture of Violence, 64 CHINA J. 143 (2010) and 
Yojana Sharma, Vocational Students Face Exploitation in Sweatshops, 209 University 
World News (Feb. 19, 2012). But see Virginia Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, The Recursivity 
of Reform, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. (2014).  
402 Xiangmin Liu, How Institutional and Organizational Characteristics Explain the 
Growth of Contingent Work in China, 68 INDUS. & LAB. RES. REV. 372 (2015).  
403 Yang Cao & Beth Rubin, Market Transition and the Deinstitutionalization of 
Standard Work Hours in Post-Socialist China, 67 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 864 (2014).  
404 William Hurst et al., Implementing China’s Labor Law Reforms: Interests and 
Obligations at the Firm Level, in LAW AND POLICY FOR CHINA’S MARKET SOCIALISM 118 
(John Garrick ed., 2012) and Aaron Halegua, The Debate Over Raising Chinese Labor 
Standards Goes International, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (2007).  
405 Eli Friedman, Experimentation and Decentralization in China’s Labor Relations, 
68 HUM. REL. 181 (2015). 
 406 Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011); Pierre 
Landry, The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: Evidence from Survey Data, in 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/2
  
2018] The False Hope of Union Democracy 699 
been to move labor NGOs into the employment law realm,407 many 
have turned to try and promote collective bargaining.408 Yet, the 
CCP response, as in other areas of public interest legal work, has 
been to continue to actively repress any private horizontal solidar-
ity,409 and has begun to match this repression by increasing govern-
ment legal aid lawyers to limit the demand for private labor NGO 
representation.410  
Still, workers have remained uncowed by a lack of ACFTU re-
form, and have even begun to engage in offensive strikes against 
employers.411 All of these changes recall the democratizing prece-
dent that the CCP fears.  Yet, here again the focal concerns of the still 
inchoate Chinese labor movement seem tangential to outside calls 
for union democracy.  Ching Kwan Lee has directly criticized the 
seduction of voluntarism in labor organizing, what she calls a “pol-
itics of freedom” in contrast to a more grounded “politics of neces-
sity.”412  As such, procedural formalism within unions seems to be 
an experiment that only the CCP seems consistently concerned with, 
and the existence of this permitted experimentation is evidence itself 
of how the broader potential of union elections is perceived.  Chi-
nese workers seem far more taken with organizing collective action 
on a popular basis and gaining substantive concessions, than with 
ACFTU reform itself.413 
Centralization and hierarchy, the products of Michels’ iron rule, 
is exactly what the CCP fears and what the labor movement is de-
nied.  The view of the CCP is clarifying to the extent that it sees labor 
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organizing purely through a social movement lens.  Without a labor 
movement, no amount of legal change will transform the fundamen-
tal reality of Chinese workers, even if the CCP manages to increase 
their social welfare over time through simulated corporatism.414 The 
recent reassertion of central authority in China, alongside systemic 
and violent crackdowns on legal activism, has only made the CCP’s 
simulated corporatism a more likely site of further investment. But 
it also shows that the terrain of resistance must match this scale, lest 
it be mired in more myopic views of workplace justice that only feed 
that power and legitimacy of new corporatist bargainers. 
If a Chinese labor movement does rise to challenge the CCP, it 
would need to engage the same process of establishing internal dis-
cipline rather than formal democratic process—bringing workers 
out of the myopia of their disheartening workplace realities.  Espe-
cially for outside observers, union democracy seems as easy as a self-
evident ideal to promote as it was in Brazil, but is far less attractive 
in a practical sense, if not destructive, to the political bargaining 
power of an even more genuinely representative Chinese labor 
movement. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
The national labor law traditions of the 20th century are almost 
universally beset by the need to re-institutionalize the outcome of 
acute political struggles, a process that invariably leaves them with 
substantial gaps between ideal and real functions.415 The collective 
bargaining inherent in most such systems has also been essentially 
reactive to other social and economic pre-conditions—it requires 
constant energetic inputs and is subject to intense feedback from la-
bor market dynamics and ongoing political contests.  
The aspiration for economic justice that gives rise to calls for 
strong and active labor unions recurrently confronts how, in the con-
text of labor commodification, there will always be mismatches be-
tween the present and any desired future.  The preoccupation with 
union democracy under the decentralized and privately ordered 
form of U.S. unionization may, at first blush, serve as an ideal 
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platform for better facilitating the emergence of a more radical eco-
nomic change.  Yet, in practice it only exacerbates this underlying 
mismatch by engaging with capital through its ideological pre-
sumptions of free individual contracting than by engaging its prac-
tical tactics of agglomeration and delocalization.  The relative suc-
cess of the Brazilian system and regulatory tactics of China’s 
authoritarian regime posit the hard-to-swallow possibility that em-
bracing, rather than fleeing from, Michels’ iron law of oligarchy may 
be the better strategy.  This is in essence a claim about institutional 
ecology—truly democratically organized workplaces struggle to 
thrive in an economic system that otherwise operates on authoritar-
ian governance norms,416 or will only form to the limited extent they 
can find specific occupational niches.417 
This dynamic may seem dismal to those that hold to more aspi-
rational functions for labor unions, but it is quite understandable 
how the social unionism underlying the most successful labor move-
ments has been invariably tied to moments when labor unions, 
whatever their formal structures, could produce high-levels of social 
capital needed to overwhelm the operational logics of wage-labor 
markets.418 The production of this social capital is not centered in 
workplaces as microcosms of political democracies, or produced 
through variations of liberal electoral proceduralism.  It is built 
through the work of social engagement, performance and internal 
discipline necessary for any political agent and at the heart of any 
non-utopian social movement. 
Especially for labor law scholars, the creative use of legal strate-
gies within an existing legal framework is always attractive—it is 
inherent in the nature of legal intellectual work.  But such tactical 
constraints risk continuing the reality Harry Arthurs noted for labor 
intellectuals, where the “disjuncture between good ideas and bad 
outcomes is deeply disturbing.”419 
It may seem that at points in this paper, comparative examples 
have been used only to implicitly critique U.S. labor law and 
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scholarship.  But the recent and growing challenges to Brazilian la-
bor unions signal that no system, however comparatively successful 
to date, is safe.  Certainly, even the most lucid analysis of Chinese 
labor unrest yields no clear answers, and points to dark future pos-
sibilities.  While the more genuinely corporatist legacy of many Eu-
ropean labor systems has gained a great deal for their workers, even 
the historically strongest unions have begun to buckle under dec-
ades of pressure from globalization.420 The cultural and occupa-
tional diversification of Europe has made convincing workers of 
their common cause more difficult,421 and many systems have al-
ready been seriously weakened by efforts to decentralize bargaining 
structures.422 Some see labor unions as a bridge to a re-democratized 
European Union,423 but even the recognition of a right to collective 
bargaining by the European Court of Human Rights has not staved 
off the growth of nativist movements which seek to cleave the class 
solidarities built by earlier labor movement. 
The discussion over labor union design thus cannot be a simple 
retelling of the victories of the past, but must delve into how to rec-
reate and most durably re-entrench them.  As Herbert Hoovencamp 
noted in his study of labor conspiracies, once the assumption that 
combinations of labor and capital are functionally equivalent is ac-
cepted in legal doctrine or social analysis, labor will always face de-
vising compensatory and defensive strategies.424 The fight for labor 
power and social democracy will thus always be a combination of 
cultural messaging and legal tactics—as with any social move-
ment.425 And it also involves centralization, hierarchy and internal 
self-discipline in order to achieve political change-not satisfy ideal-
isms. 
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There is no shortage of reforms possible to improve the lives of 
workers that do not involve unions.426 There has been a drive in the 
past decade to more aggressively imagine possibility for social re-
form beyond that deemed immediately feasible.  Erik Olin Wright 
has coined the term “real utopias” to capture the fusion between in-
telligent institutional design and social aspiration.427 Some such re-
forms can still fall into the old category of legal transplant, such as 
attacks on at-will employment.428 But today, the sense of ongoing 
crisis in economic organization has made the common contempla-
tion of ideas that were considered irresponsibly unrealistic just a few 
years ago, most notably renewed calls for job guarantees or basic 
minimum incomes.429  
Various corporate governance reforms continue to try to recon-
cile worker empowerment with owner self-interest, from modes of 
direct representation430 to private governance reforms aimed at 
maximizing Dau-Schmidt’s cooperative surplus.431 Just as with col-
lective bargaining, these are compensatory measures whose ambi-
tion starts from the assumption that labor commodification is an in-
evitability.  Whatever their individual capacity to improve the lives 
of workers, it is notable that most of these reforms no longer argue 
in the language of class conflict, but do so increasingly in a non-con-
flictual language of productive efficiency or technological utopian-
ism. 
The diagnosis of the counterproductive aspiration of union de-
mocracy presented in this article casts overlapping doubts on the 
power of these reforms.432 Such doubts do not return us to com-
munist visions of labor that degenerated on their own terms, but to 
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the radical republican visions which embrace cooperative or em-
ployee ownership.433 The ideal of either expanding the extensivity 
and intensivity of capital ownership to allow for widespread em-
ployee ownership or promoting various forms of mandatory profit-
sharing have always garnered formal, if superficial, endorsement by 
often antagonistic political interests.  But whatever episodic support 
has been given to such efforts, attempts to systemically promote 
such alternative configurations have remained quite weak.434 
Some of this weakness reflects a variation of the ecological prob-
lem—developing truly different forms of economic organization 
from within logically antagonistic systems leads to unpredictable 
mutations435 and often incredibly high interface costs with existing 
legal and economic institutions.436 The non-replication of even suc-
cessfully run employee-owned business and the less-than-stellar 
global track-record of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) 
speaks to this difficulty.437 At their core, conceptions of labor are 
about the basic distribution of power in any society, and systemic 
changes, as with Meidner’s wage-fund proposal, cannot be expected 
to be met without enduring resistance.438 
Following their function as corporatist bargainers, unions have 
historically devoted little effort to expanding capital ownership as a 
long-term solution,439 and leading ownership advocate Robert 
Hockett does not even mention unions in his review of possible 
“ownership spreading” mechanisms.440 Even pro-union advocates 
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across the globe who seek to constitutionalize more radical anti-sub-
ordination principles stop short of the historical radical republican 
arguments about wage-labor,441 in what James Pope would call full 
“constitutional insurgency.”442  
Perhaps any proposal that conceptualizes the workplace as an 
instance of shared property or argues that labor can gain property 
rights in the workplace by accretion are considered unworkable as 
much as they may be consonant with populist sentiments.443 Yet, 
even if more radical reforms regarding the property/commodity di-
vide are deemed unrealistic or unattainable, union democracy is not 
a productive long-term solution to achieving any future desired 
state. 
In many ways, this is again an old argument about the goals of 
labor movements and the possibilities of radical reform.444 Natu-
rally, to proponents of end of history arguments about the rise of 
modern corporate capitalism claims that union democracy is a dis-
traction from radical economic change may seem obtuse.445 None-
theless, for those labor advocates caught up in Mundlak’s anomie, 
the diagnosis in this article is offered as an empirical point about 
how to think about labor unions as they are, not as we might hope 
them to be.  We should not despair that labor unions are not working 
to render themselves obsolete; they are valuable for too many other 
reasons. 
If unions are to transition away from corporatism, or even away 
from electoral politics, it should not be to perform experiments in 
procedural democracy, but to better build and aggregate political 
capital.  As divergent from the social and legal context of the U.S.  
Brazil and China may appear to be,446 they all point to the fact that 
solidarity and power are the core aim of any labor movement, and 
great liability exists when idealism about the nature of the 
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workplace, or even labor itself, overwhelms this concern.447 And 
perhaps there can never be a substitute for a genuine labor party that 
is related to, but independent from, labor unions themselves to serve 
as the final locus of labor power. 
When we want to imagine labor unions as something beyond 
collective bargainers, such imagining is only responsible if it serves 
to give workers what labor markets invariably do not.  Not power 
against individual employers, but solidarity.  This form of pragma-
tism, where labor corporatism is the least-worst form of collective 
bargaining, frees us to think more directly about how to achieve this 
solidarity without conceptual or intellectual distraction. 
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